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B a c k g r o u n d  an d  S u m m a r y .
Economic theory is capable of explaining the development  and
persistence of social conventions, such as conventions of cooperation, 
in the face of circumstances characterised by the Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
Such conventions can arise either because of  labelling and the
iterated nature of the playing of the game or because of related 
overlapping activities. A social convention becomes a social norm or 
custom when it acquires moral forces such as guilt and resentment at 
its violation. Consider the following example. I am in line for a ticket 
for the next train from my local station. The other people in the 
queue are hoping to catch the same train, the departure of which is 
imminent. The local social convention is one of respecting the order 
of arrival in the queue, but late-comers to the line have an incentive 
to jump the queue. If the queue breaks up into a melee, then the
resulting crush around the ticket booth causes delay and implies that 
fewer people will catch the train. Do I jump line? If this is a repeated
game played every day by the same people, then I'm likely to stay in
line: in the longer run I have a vested interest in the survival of the 
social convention. However, if then I'm abroad on holiday and find 
myself in exactly the same position but amongst strangers whom I 
will never expect to meet again, will I respect equally their local
social convention of respecting the order of the queue? If I'm
narrowly rational I will not. But if for me the social convention which 
I recognise and respect at home five days a week has acquired some 
moral force, then I will feel too guilty to break out of line and
consequently I will risk missing my train. The social convention has 
become a social norm or custom which I follow because of my 
experience and my socio-psychological characterist ics against my 
narrowly rational judgement.
In this thesis we shall be developing a model in which agents'
actions are influenced by the utility they derive from two related
sources. The first is the utility derived from conforming with the
behaviour of others. We shall refer to this as solidarity-derived 
utility. The second is the utility gained from obeying a social norm or 
custom (or the disutility suffered from breaking that custom). We 
take the existence of the social custom as given. This is why we
distinguish between a social convention which is derivable from the 
postulates of rationality and a social custom which we treat as given 
(as are preferences) by non-rational information. This is discussed 
more fully in Chapter 2.
Thereafter our chief concern is to integrate the treatment of 
social customs into more mainstream economic analysis. Our main 
focus is on the question of what our analysis contributes to the 
economic theory of  the trade union. There are a number of reasons 
for the choice of this context as the medium for discussion of the 
model. First, union membership is a classic example of a collective 
action in which the public good provided is characterised by non­
exclusion.  Second,  empirical evidence points  to the widespread 
existence of the union open shop in which membership is not 
compulsory. Third, survey and other evidence suggests the relevance 
of social custom forces as determinants o f  union membership by 
individuals. Fourth, union membership is an important topic in its 
own right, especial ly in the light of qui te  dramatic changes in 
aggregate union density in the UK and elsewhere, and yet not one 
satisfactorily addressed in the theoretical literature on trade unions. 
Finally, union membership is likely to be an important influence on 
l abour  market  ou tcomes  and the re fo re  on m acroeconom ic  
perfo rmance.
Chapter 1 Social Customs and the Labour Market:  
an In trod uct ion
In recent years there has been a growing literature on the role of 
social customs in the labour market. Marsden (1986), for example, 
has emphasised the importance of group norms and social customs 
in various labour market contexts. Jones (1984) develops an
economic model of conforming behaviour in which an individual's 
work effort  is determined partly by tradition and by the
behaviour of  other workers. A central theme of this literature is 
that a rational economic agent does not inhabit a social vacuum 
and hence that individual behaviour is influenced, to some extent, 
by the actions of others. Simon (1983, pp. 75) expresses this 
theme particularly persuasively: "Why," he asks, "talk about social 
decision making? Isn't it enough to talk about individual decision 
making?. . .Today there is abroad in the land the libertarian
delusion that individuals are some sort of Leibnizian monads . . ., 
each with a consistent independent utility function and each 
interacting with its fellows only through its knowledge of market 
prices. Not so. We are not monads because, among many other
reasons, our values, the alternatives of actions that we are aware 
of, our understanding of what consequences may flow from our 
actions - all this knowledge, all these preferences - derive from 
our interaction with our social environment. Some of  our values 
and knowledge were sucked in with our mother's milk; others 
were taken, often quite uncritically, from our social environment. . 
.but few indeed, surely, in complete independence of it."
1
Nonetheless ,  the dominant  mode of economic analysis 
largely neglects  such considerations. Economists frequent ly 
dismiss the relevance for economic analysis of social norms with 
the retort that these are in the domain of enquiry for other social 
science disciplines. It is, they argue, for sociologists and social 
psychologists to be concerned with the derivation of  individuals'  
preferences. The economists can then take these as given and 
consider what economic outcomes will follow from them. If, 
however,  individual  preferences are constant ly changing in 
response to the economic environment  which they themselves 
largely shape, then the assumption of exogenei ty is invalid. 
Similarly, if individual preferences are not independent,  then 
economists have to revise their thinking.
The starting point of this thesis is the observation that, in 
important economic contexts,  individuals'  actions appear to be 
influenced by the actions and beliefs of others. Evidence on this is 
presented at relevant stages through the thesis (see for example, 
the evidence cited in Chapter 4 on why individuals join trade 
unions). It could be argued that there is no need to model this 
interaction between individuals'  beliefs and actions, and therefore 
no need to refine the orthodox economic approach, were it the 
case that this approach provided a satisfactory framework in such 
in teract ive  contexts .  However ,  this a rgument  canno t  be
maintained: not even by the traditional "as if" defence of 
methodological positivism. This is because the predictions of  the
3orthodox model do not sit comfortably with actual outcomes. For 
example, as Olson (1965) has argued, economic logic militates 
against successful collective action in large numbers contexts. Yet 
it is apparent that this logic does not describe real behaviour in 
the many situations where the free-riding option is spurned. 
Albeit to a differing degree - and one which varies over time and 
across individuals and societies - individuals vote, pay taxes, take 
their litter home, give blood, donate to charities, pay extra for 
environmentally-fr iendly products and join in demonstrat ions.  
The issue at the centre of this thesis revolves around the question 
of how, if at all, we can reconcile this behaviour  with the 
assumptions of economic rationality.
There have been many attempts to refine the definition of 
economic rationality in such a way as to be able to explain how 
the problem of the Prisoners' dilemma is overcome. In this thesis, 
however, we focus on a social custom approach which has its 
origins in the work of Akerlof (1980) and which has been 
developed in various contexts by a growing variety of researchers 
(see, for example, Cowell (1990), Gordon (1989), Booth (1985) and 
Booth and Chatterji (1991)). It can also be argued that the work of 
Elster (1985), Jones (1984) and Sugden (1986) is sympathetic to 
the relevance of the social custom approach. We shall be careful to 
define, develop and apply this approach in subsequent chapters. 
For now we merely note that the major justification we offer for 
adopting the social custom analysis is based on the claim that in
this way we are able to explain various otherwise puzzling 
features of economic behaviour.
The outline of the rest of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 
2 we review the literature relevant to the economic analysis of 
social customs. In particular we are concerned with the related 
issues of the optimality and the evolution of social customs. One 
key question is whether  social custom analysis is necessarily 
behaviouralist in its methodological heritage or whether social 
customs can be given a foundation within an orthodox neoclassical 
framework through the insights of evolutionary game theory.
In Chapter 3 we provide a formal derivation of the social 
custom model in the general context of explaining the logic of 
collective action. We demonstrate the close relationship between 
our model and the work of Schelling on the micro-motives of 
macro-behaviour. We consider applications of the model to the 
issues of explaining trade union membership density and strike- 
solidarity levels. The original feature of our work is the relaxation 
of the assumption that  all individuals  are identical.  The 
assumption of heterogeneity enables us to explain important 
’stylised facts' of behaviour in these contexts.
In Chapter 4 we argue that the social custom approach 
developed in the previous chapter will  remain of  limited 
significance in the wider  domain of economic analysis until it can 
be shown how the approach can be integrated into more
5mainstream analyses of economic behaviour. This is the task set 
for Chapter 4 where we combine the social custom model of trade 
union density with the more mainstream microeconomic theory of 
the trade union. We argue that this is an important step to take as 
the p redominan t  approach has been to assume that wage 
bargaining takes place between a firm and a trade union which 
has c losed shop powers. Instead, open shop arrangements 
character ise  the majority of  bargaining cases and therefore 
motivate  an analysis of the causes  and consequences of 
intermediate union representation within the establishment. A 
second novel feature which chapter 4 shares with the subsequent 
chapter is the treatment of union density in the disagreement 
payoff to the firm when bargaining takes place.
In Chapter 5 we pursue the themes developed in Chapter 4, 
but adopt the assumption of a role for management opposition to 
trade union organisation in the determination of union density 
and therefore of relative bargaining power. In both these chapters 
we deve lop the comparat ive static propert ies of the model, 
identifying the ways in which they differ from more conventional 
analyses .
In Chapter  6 we consider  two further labour market 
applications of the general approach with which we are concerned. 
The first is to the issue of the credibility of the threat of 
harassment in the insider-outsider approach which explains the 
decision by outsiders not to underbid as resulting from threats
6made by insiders to harass new entrants,  thereby raising the 
entrants' disutility of work [see Lindbeck and Snower (1988)]. It 
has been argued [Elster (1989) and Fehr (1990)] that the 
harassment threat is not credible, at least in the one-period case. 
We explore this claim, concluding that some social convention is 
necessary for the validity of the harassment argument in the 
Lindbeck and Snower (1988) one-period insider-outsider model. 
Hence, we are in agieement with both Akerlof (1980) and Elster 
(1989). However, we find the addition of a role for a social 
convention to be otherwise consistent with the insider-outsider 
framework and, in particular, (i) to add further weight to the 
claim that insider-outsider models can provide a rationale for the 
presence of trade unions and (ii) to suggest an important role for 
discr iminat ion.
The second application is to the question of tax evasion. In 
this context, Cowell (1990) has shown that empirical evidence 
suggests the importance of taking into account the influence on 
taxpayers' behaviour of, inter alia, morality and the attitudes and 
actions of community. In particular, Cowell cites evidence from 
Baldry (1986, 1987) that some individuals choose not to evade, 
apparently on moral grounds,'  and from Schwartz and Orleans 
(1967) indicating that. Social devices that appeal to conscience 
and civic responsibil ity may be more effective than legal 
sanctions.’ In the current context we argue that our understanding 
of the impact of morality and conformity on tax evasion can be
enhanced by the application to this problem of the social custom 
model. Finally, in Chapter 7 we offer some concluding remarks.
8Chapter  2 The Economic Analysis of Social Customs.
2 . 1  B a c k g r o u n d
It is well known that orthodox neoclassical economic theory does 
not provide a satisfactory logic with which to explain the many 
and  important  instances of collective action involving many 
persons and therefore characterised by the Prisoners'  Dilemma 
and  the associated free-rider incentives. Various authors have 
attempted to broaden the definition of rational economic agency 
to provide a role for such arguments as sympathy and altruism 
within individuals' utility functions. But the focus remains on an 
individual whose tastes are independent of the actions and beliefs 
of  other individuals.  Indeed, the exogenei ty  of  individual  
preferences is a crucial assumption within the framework of 
neoclassical analysis. An alternative approach to the explanation 
of  collective action has been built on the concept of social customs, 
developed originally by Akerlof (1980) to provide a micro- 
foundation for a theory of unemployment. Akerlof defines a social 
custom as, 'An act whose utility to the agent performing it in some 
way depends on the beliefs or actions of other members of the 
community. '  The approach is grounded in utility theory but 
introduces the possibility of interdependence across individuals'  
act ions and beliefs. No man (nor woman) - not even an 
economically-rational one - is an Island. In this chapter we shall 
be examining the extent to which social customs can be motivated 
and analysed within traditional economic theory. First, however.
9we describe the type of collective action problem which will
provide the focus for much of our subsequent analysis.
2 . 2  The Logic of  Collective Action and the Prisoners'
D i l e m m a .
The greatest marketing strength of an economic system based on 
market exchange is its claim to channel the pursuit of rational 
self-interest towards the promotion of general economic welfare. 
As Adam Smith famously expressed, when an individual intends
only his own gain he is, ". . . led by an invisible hand to promote
an end which was no part of his intention. . . By pursuing his own
interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it." Much of the most
brilliant research work in economics in modern times has been
conducted to investigate the precise conditions under which this 
hypothesis is valid. As is well-known, these conditions are very
strict and demanding and, consequently, there is a plethora of 
cases of market failure requiring extra-market mechanisms for 
the achievement of economic efficiency. One such case occurs 
when the provision of a good has the characteristics of a collective 
action.
It is often the case in economics that a good can be provided 
only if a collective action can take place. For example, a firm-level 
trade union is unlikely be able to raise workers' wages in a firm if 
no-one joins the union. So, collectively, workers are likely to have
an incentive to form a trade union, each worker contributing to 
the organisational costs but in return receiving a higher wage than 
otherwise. So long as the wage increase exceeds the subscription 
cost, then each worker is better off as a result of the collective 
action. However, this logic which points towards collective action 
is vulnerable to the free-rider incentive which arises because the 
good which the union provides is a public good whilst the cost of 
membership is a private cost. The union-provided good is a public 
good because of the impossibility (or, at least, the infeasibility) of 
excluding non-members from receiving the bargained wage. Thus, 
each worker is likely to have a dominant strategy to free-ride. In 
this way the collective action does not take place and hence the 
public good is not provided. The problem is characterisable as a 
Prisoners' Dilemma: as Hardin has put it, ". . . the individual effort 
to achieve i n d i v id u a l  interests will preclude their achievement, 
because if the c o l l e c t i v e  good is not provided, the individual 
member fails to receive a benefit that would have exceeded the 
individual's cost in helping purchase that good for the whole 
group."
Olson (1965) argued that the problem of achieving collective 
action was unlikely to thwart action among small groups where 
cooperation and collusion is more feasible. Monitoring costs are 
lower in such cases and it is more obvious that each individual's 
contribution can make some real difference to the success of the 
collective action. Where groups are larger, however, they are 
likely to remain only latent with free-riding undermining the
prospects for successful collective action. Olson argued that to 
overcome this problem participation must be either compulsory or 
rewarded by an incentive private benefit, as we shall discuss 
more fully in later chapters.  Elster (1985) has argued that 
collective action might come about because of the in-process 
benefits of participation. For example, contributing to public life 
might be just  a way of life for some people, not an action 
unde rtaken  only a f te r  ca re fu l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  ca lcu la t ion .  
Alternatively,  if individuals are motivated by the Kantian 
Imperative', then collective action will succeed as each individual 
will do that which if universalised would lead to the optimal 
collective outcome.
In searching for explanations of successful collective action, 
and therefore solutions to the Prisoners'  Di lemma, one must 
distinguish between one-shot and repeated plays. It is well- 
established through game theory that iterated games are likely to 
lead to succesful cooperation. For example, Axelrod (1984) has 
demonstrated that Tit-for-Tat is likely to emerge as a successful 
evolutionary strategy in a multi-person environment  and pair­
wise plays of  the Prisoners' Dilemma. In one-shot games, however, 
the strategy of  not cooperating would appear, at first sight, to be 
dominant. However, an incentive to cooperate might develop even 
in such circumstances.  Hardin argues that, "The assimilation of 
one-shot efforts to the ongoing life and cooperative activities of a 
particular group can be generalised across efforts of overlapping 
groups. The overlapping nature of various activities and groups
allows cooperative conventions to arise and, more importantly, to 
be enforced. . . various members of a large class of related or 
similar games may be faced more or less sequent ial ly by 
substantially overlapping groups. In this manner, a convention 
covering the behaviour of a very large class of people, none of 
whom interacts personally with more than a fraction of the class, 
can be built up out of smaller sub-group interactions in a large 
class of situations." We shall return to the question of the origin 
and persistence of such social conventions later in this chapter. 
First, however, we consider the social custom approach.
2 . 3  The Social  Custom Approach to Explaining Collective  
A c t i o n
In recent years, the social custom framework has been applied to 
the problem of collective action. Booth (1985) is concerned with 
providing an explanation for the existence of the open shop trade 
union. Booth observes that UK workplaces are often characterised 
by union membership in the absence of closed shop agreements 
compelling membership and argues that such membership is 
costly to the individual and yet cannot be explained by incentive 
private goods. As all workers in these unionised establishments 
are paid a uniform wage independent of the individual worker's 
union status,  any gains secured by the union have the
characteristics of  a public good. Therefore, union membership 
shares the features of the general collective action problem. Booth 
is able to show how a simplified version of Akerlofs social custom
model is able to provide an explanation for the existence of 
voluntary union membership.  Membership is dr iven by each 
individual's sensitivity to 'reputation'  effects: individuals derive 
utility from conforming with the behaviour of others. Thus, both 
zero and 100% membership are stable equilibria. Hence we could 
say that, theoretically, there are two possible and stable social 
norms of behaviour  within the population descr ibed by this 
model: one in which everyone joins the union and the other in 
which no-one joins.
Naylor (1989) develops a more general social custom model 
to explain the existence and persistence of collective action. In this 
approach, an individual chooses whether or not to join in a 
collective action not only according to reputation (or 'solidarity') 
effects, but also according to whether the individual is a believer 
in the social custom or not. The model is therefore a closer relative 
of the original Akerlof model. In the context of collective action, 
the social custom is best thought of as the appeal to individuals 
within the community to refrain from free-riding. For any given 
level of  belief in the social custom, and given other parameter 
values such as the cost of action to the individual and the extent 
of individual sensitivities to reputation effects, there will be some 
level of  adherence to the social custom. So far the approach is 
based firmly in the principles of individual optimisation. But the 
outcome is defined to be stable only if the resulting level of 
adherence to the social custom is equal to the initial and given 
level of belief in the social custom. If this condition is not satisfied.
then it is assumed that the proportion of the population believing 
in the social custom changes until it generates an equal level of 
adherence.  This  is then the s teady-sta te  se lf -suppor t ing  
equilibrium. The assumption that, out of equilibrium, it is the 
proportion of the population believing in the social custom which 
changes is an arbitrary one, but one which can be justified in 
various ways. For example,  a cognit ive dissonance argument  
would be consistent with a shift to belief in the social custom by 
those individuals previously not believing but nonetheless joining 
in the collective action on the strength of the reputation or 
solidarity effects.
In this approach, then, individuals choose optimally whether 
or not to adhere to the social custom but they do not make an 
optimising decision regarding their belief in the social custom: this 
depends both on their own adherence decision (itself influenced 
by the actions and beliefs of others) and on such other socio- 
psychological character ist ics as those relating to the cognitive 
dissonance argument. In sum, an explanation of the degree of 
support for a given social custom - or of  the existence of a 
particular social norm - rests on neither 'structureless agency’ nor 
'agentless structure'. The social custom approach incorporates 
important elements of  rational choice theory but is not based 
exclusively on the assumption of opt imising  agents  with 
exogenous preferences: the socio-economic environment , i tself 
only partly explained within the model, and the pyschological 
responses of individuals are other crucial features of the model.
2 . 4  The Origin of Social Norms: Rationality versus Extra-
R a t i o n a l i t y
The foregoing begs an important question: What is the origin of 
the social customs whose existence we have so far taken as 
given?' As examples, why might there be social customs evoking 
individuals to join unions, to pick up litter, to give blood, to pay 
taxes, or more generally to refrain from free-riding?
Let us consider, then, the issue of the emergence of social 
norms.  Within rat ional  choice theory,  we have already 
distinguished between, on the one hand, an economic agent whose 
preferences are given and self-regarding and, on the other, what 
we might call a socio-economic agent whose goals and choices are
likely to be influenced by the actions and beliefs of others. We
shall now argue that it is possible to explain the emergence of 
what Sugden terms a 'social convention' within a model built on 
the assumption of rational economic agency. But we shall argue, 
with Sugden, that a social convention is different from a social 
norm and that the emergence of the latter takes us outside the
narrow scope of rational economic agency.
Sugden (1986) develops a game-theoretic explanation of the 
emergence of  social conventions. He presents conventions as rules 
regulating social life and as evolving spontaneously to become
self-enforcing once established. More formally, a convention is
defined as any stable equilibrium in a game that has two or more 
stable equilibria. Sugden shows that this concept is more general 
than that of Lewis (1969) for whom:
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population 
P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a c o n v e n t i o n  
if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, 
in any instance of S among members of P,
(1)  everyone conforms to R;
(2)  everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
(3)  everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that 
the others do, since S is a coordination problem and 
uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in S.
(1969, p. 58)
Sugden d i s t ingu ishes  between three broad categories  of 
conventions (convent ions of coordination, of property and of 
reciprocity) only one of which (the convention of coordination 
arising out of a pure coordination game) is consistent with the 
third clause in Lewis's definition. The convention of reciprocity is 
the most relevant to our foregoing discussion of collective action 
problems as Sugden shows how repeated public-good games 
provide one context for the evolution of such conventions. In such 
games individuals choose between strategies of cooperation (e.g. 
of joining a collective action) and defection (free-riding) and 
whilst cooperation is not in individuals'  immediate interests, a 
stable strategy (such as Ti t- for-Tat)  of cooperating with other
cooperators  can arise under  appropriate c i rcumstances.  One 
condition for this is that the probability of the game finishing
after any given round is sufficiently small. The crucial assumption
here is, of course, that the game is not being played anonymously. 
If a fellow player is either unlikely to meet you again, or unlikely 
to either recognise you or remember your deed in the future, then 
there is little scope for the evolut ion of a convention of
cooperat ion.
Kandori (1992) has argued that enforcements  can be
classified into two categories. In the repeated game literature, the 
Folk Theorem provides a formal model of personal enforcement 
occurring when the same set of agents frequently play the same 
stage game ad infinitum. A second mechanism is community 
enforcement which can generate social norms of cooperation when 
facilitated by labelling of defectors. Yet cooperation does exist in 
circumstances under which labelling is not feasible. There are a 
number of possible reasons for this. The first is often dismissed as 
tautological. It is the argument of  the in-process benefits of giving: 
this widening of the interpretation of utility can always be offered 
in defense of rational choice theories. A second answer adds some 
psychological flesh to the bones of the rational economic agent, 
suggesting that individuals have basic emotional  responses of 
resentment and guilt to the breaking of  established conventions. 
This argument is developed by Sugden (1986 ch. 8). In this way it 
could be argued that an apparently unsustainable social norm of 
cooperating in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma can evolve from a
social convention of reciprocal cooperation when the latter 
acquires a moral force through the psychological reactions of 
individuals. As a corollary of this view, one could justify the social 
custom approach discussed earlier.
Economic rationality, then, can explain the evolution of social 
conventions, but some socio-psychological structure is needed to 
explain the development of the social norms which are capable of 
sustaining cooperation in the face of a dominant  free-rider 
incentive. The inclusion of a role for social norms is likely to be 
most relevant in circumstances favourable to the evolution of 
social conventions. This is more likely when a group of individuals 
is homogeneous and highly interactive. This is consistent with 
Axelrod's (1984) discussion of the evolution of cooperation. It also 
provides an economic underpinning for the sociological argument 
deriving from Kerr and Siegel (1954) who distinguish between the 
'isolated mass' and the 'integrated individual'. The isolated mass is 
said to possess its "own codes, myths, heroes and social 
standards," and consequently to be the more capable of sustaining 
collective action. It might be argued that individuals whose social 
development  has been within such an environment  are more 
likely to contribute toward pubic good provision. Thus, in some 
sense apparently altruistic behaviour is a backward-looking or 
learned response. The argument which started out as a rational 
choice micro-foundat ion for social conventions has acquired a 
behavioural ist  e lement  through the inclusion of a role for 
psychological responses such as guilt and resentment.
It would appear,  then, that t radi tional  rat ional-choice 
economic theory can explain the evolution of social conventions of 
reciprocal cooperation. Unreciprocated or altruistic cooperation is 
then explicable as the behaviour of  an individual who has 
attributed a moral force to those social conventions through the 
individual’s proneness to guilt or resentment,  amongst other 
psychological responses. Thus evolve social norms or customs. 
Importantly, we should note with both Akerlof and Sugden that 
there is no reason to suppose that the particular convention or the 
norm which becomes established will be the one which maximises 
social welfare. So what does determine the selection of a 
part icular  convent ion? Sugden argues that versatil ity is an 
important  criterion in the selection of conventions.  Schelling 
(1960) argues in favour of prominence which depends on time 
and place and who the people are. '  One is, 'dealing with 
imagination as much as with logic.' This leaves an important role 
for the analysis of how individuals interpret their environment 
within which they then make their choices over behaviour.
Until this point we have stayed within the tradition of 
methodologica l  individual ism in d iscuss ing the spontaneous 
evolution of social conventions and norms pertaining to the logic 
of collective action. However, a further possible influence on the 
selection of social conventions is the exertion of power by groups 
of  agents with both influence and vested interests in the 
arrangement  of social conventions. For example,  by capturing
political power  groups or classes can  seek to shape the 
environment in which social conventions evolve. Our analysis 
would suggest that governments wary of the development  of 
communit ies  capable of organising effective collective action 
would have an incentive to avoid the generation of 'isolated 
masses' of individuals. To the extent that collective provision is an 
alternative to market provision, the interests of profit-seekers 
would imply the same incentive. More generally, the argument 
that individuals '  preferences are inf luenced by social and 
psychological  factors  provides  a channel  through which 
commercial forces originating in the objectives of producers can 
be seen to shape individual behaviour. Once it is established that 
the wants to which capitalist production is responding are, at least 
in part, determined directly or indirect ly within a capitalist 
system of production, then the whole structure of that system is 
invert ible.
2 . 5  C o n c l u s i o n
To conclude, then, it is argued that social attitudes such as those 
captured by social conventions are likely to influence individual 
economic behaviour in the spheres of  both public good and 
private good provision. To some significant extent the persistence 
of social conventions can be explained by rational individual 
behaviour: although there need be no presumption that the 
conventions which survive will be the most efficient. We have 
drawn a distinction between social conventions and social norms.
arguing that the latter are not wholly explicable in a rational 
choice analysis, but motivate the social custom framework for the 
economic analysis of collective action problems. Finally, we have 
considered different explanations for the emergence of particular 
social norms in response to the perennial question, 'Where do
social norms come from?' Perhaps the most salient reply to this
question stems from the argument that men and women do not
live atomistically, but in social groups and communities. No two 
communities will be identical: some will be highly cooperative, 
others quite non-cooperative. In the latter case, individuals are
more likely to resemble the neoclassical stereotype of  the self- 
regarding rational economic agent. But social norm analysis can 
claim to encompass such a case within a more general framework: 
as the social custom model predicts, there are likely to be multiple 
social equilibria of which zero cooperation is just one possibility.
C h a p t e r  3 A Social Custom Model  of Collective Act ion.
3.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the logic of collective action, 
because of its public good and Prisoners' Dilemma characteristics, 
has defied satisfactory explanation within the framework of 
conventional economic analysis. Olson (1965) argued that in large 
group contexts collective action would be impossible in the 
absence of compulsion. This is because there is a dominating free­
rider incentive not to join if joining is costly and the benefits of 
collective action accrue to joiners and non-joiners alike. Booth 
(1985) showed in the context of trade union membership that 
collective action can be explained if individuals are sensitive to 
reputation effects - or group solidarity efects as we shall prefer to 
call them. Booth's work represents an application to the collective 
action literature of  the social custom model developed by Akerlof 
(1980). As we demonstrate in the course of this chapter, Booth's 
model is essentially equivalent to the discrete choice analysis 
suggested by Schelling (1978). In each of Booth's and Schelling's 
models individuals are treated as identical and therefore as 
homogeneous with respect to their sensitivities to solidarity 
effects - or, in Schelling's terms, to their critical mass points.
In the current chapter we offer a model closely akin to 
Akerlof 's  social custom model and which encompasses  the
Schelling model by generalising the analysis of collective action to 
the case where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to 
their 'cross-over '  points. This, we shall argue, is the major 
contribution that this chapter attempts to make. We then argue 
that this more general formal model is in fact closer to the spirit 
and substance of much of Schelling's discussion than is the special 
case in which individuals are assumed to be identical. We show 
however that the results derived in the latter model do not hold 
for the case in which individuals differ. We find that many of 
Schelling's formal results follow from the particular assumption of 
homogeneous individuals. Much richer possibilities arise when we 
relax this assumption.
Furthermore, we believe that the model yields important 
insights into a number of issues relating to the explanation of 
collective action. These are discussed in Section 3.3 of this chapter. 
In particular, we address the issues of; the origin and persistence 
of social norms, the sustainability of collective action, the role of 
Kantian behaviour and the significance for economic analysis and 
methodology of the interdependence of individual and collective 
behaviour. In Section 3.4 we highlight the empirical content ot the 
model, focussing on the application of our framework to the issues 
of union membership and strike solidarity. In Section 3.5 we draw 
together our general conclusions. The next Section of  the paper 
develops the formal model.
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3.2 The Formal Model
Our concern is with situations in which the individual has a 
choice between participating in collective action or of free-riding. 
The outcome of the action is assumed to be a public good. Whether 
or how the provision of the public good depends upon the degree 
of support for - i.e. the proportion of the potential population 
participating in - the collective action is not relevant to our 
concern. As we shall see, this item drops out of our analysis. 
Conversely,  much o f  Schelling's analysis of participation in 
collective action is focussed on the sensitivity of participation to 
the nature of the dependence on participation of the provision of 
the public good. We are able to abstract from this issue because of 
the way in which we set up the social custom model in this 
chapter. In chapter 4, however, we shall return to this discussion 
in the context of the influence of union density on the union's 
ability to raise the level of wages. In this chapter,  we are 
interested in identifying the factors which determine the level of 
participation. For ease of exposition we specify initially simple 
payoff functions, but  show later that our results are readily 
amenable to a greater degree of generalisation.
Let the payoff or  reward, Ui, to an individual i be written as: 
Uj = w - dQ + eipQ, (3.1)
2 4
where
individual i's payoff or utility.
2 5
the value of the public good provided as a 
result of the collective action. We assume 
that the population is sufficiently large that 
the individual disregards the marginal 
contribution his/her membership makes to the 
magnitude of w.
the private cost to the individual of 
participating in the collective action and, for 
simplicity, is independent of the level of 
m em bersh ip .
the degree of support for the collective 
action, i.e. the proportion of the population 
who join.
1 if the individual joins
0 otherwise.
the solidarity-derived benefit to the 
individual of participating in the collective 
action and depends upon the degree of 
support .
We are asssuming, then, the possibility of the existence of  
solidarity-derived utility. There is in this no necessary role for a 
social custom of membership. Individuals are assumed to have a 
sort of herding instinct but not a social conscience at this point. 
This is an important distinction often missed in the literature. Of 
course, one might want to argue that a social custom invoking 
cooperat ion might lie behind the sol idari ty-derived ut i l i ty  
obtaining more strongly among the group of cooperators. In s u b ­
section 3.3.(ii) we discuss this further. In 3.3.(iii) we then add a 
more explicit role for the social custom to influence behaviour 
directly. We follow Akerlof in defining a social custom as, "An act 
whose utility to the agent performing it in some way depends 
upon the actions or beliefs of fellow agents in the community." For 
our purposes in studying collective action, the social custom is 
best thought of as an implicit moral edict urging individuals to 
refrain from free-riding.
It is necessary to say more about the characteristic ej. as 
different interpretations are possible in different contexts. In our  
work we are interested essentially in the impact on collective 
action of social norms. In par t icular,  we investigate the 
consequences that stem from the assumption that there is a social 
norm or custom which invokes individuals to join collective action 
rather than to free-ride. We shall have more to say later about the 
origin of such norms. We interpret ei as a measure of the valuation 
by individual i of the solidarity effects that derive from acting 
with others in the manner prescribed by the social custom. In this
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the model follows Akerlof (1980). Alternatively, we could have 
specif ied ei to proxy the shame effects derived from non­
membership. There is, however, no formal difference between the 
two. The latter would have been closer to the view espoused by 
Elster (1989, pp. 105.) of a social norm as generating, "...the 
propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions by others at 
the thought of behaving in a certain, forbidden way."
Nevertheless, our model is close to the spirit of  the 
argument  made by Elster (1989, pp. 151.) that, "Actions are 
shaped jointly by norms and self-interest." In equation (3.1) the 
payoff represents a single function valuing both pecuniary factors 
(w, d) and non-pecuniary ones (ei). From (1.1) it follows that.
UiJ = w - d + ej|i ,
and
UiNJ= w ,
where UjJ and UiNJ are the payoffs from joining and not joining, 
respectively. We assume that the individual will join the collective 
action so long as UiJ > UiNJ,
i.e., w - d + eip > w, or, ei > d/p . (3.2)
The fact that w drops out of the inequality justifies our earlier 
s ta tement  that the current  chapter  will not address the 
determinants of  w. We can represent  diagrammatical ly  the
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relationship described in (3.2) above by the decision schedule in 
Figure 3.1.
To determine possible levels of participation in the collective 
action we need to specify how the ej characteristic is distributed 
across the population. In the course of this chapter we shall 
consider  different possible dist ribut ions as the sensitivity of 
collective action to this distribution is of central interest to us. 
Initially, however,  we consider the case of a uniform e- 
distribution. We assume that e is distributed uniformly between a 
lower bound, say zero, and an upper bound, ej.  This distribution 
schedule is depicted in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 The distribution schedule
One property of the model is that if p = 0.25 these joiners 
will be those individuals in the upper quart ile of the e- 
distribution, as depicted in Figure 3.2. We can now integrate the 
two schedules to consider the possible equilibria in the model. An 
equilibrium occurs at p* when condition (3.2) is satisfied for the 
value of p = p* for just p* of the population. More simply, a 
necessary, though not sufficient condition, for equilibrium is that 
those joining (not joining) cannot make themselves better off by 
not joining (joining). Consider Figure 3.3 below;

3 1
Figure 3.3. (a) Critical mass and a stable intermediate
equilibrium, (b) Zero membership, (c) Unstable 
non-zero equilibrium.
At point b in Figure 3.3(a), pb of the population is joining the 
collective action. These are the individuals for whom ej > eb- The 
decision schedule tells us that any individual with ei > eb' will join. 
This condition is satisfied for all those joining and. additionally, for 
those others  with £b' S £i < £b- From this we assume that 
membership will grow: depicted by the arrow at b. Conversely, for 
p > p a some joiners have insufficiently large ei (are insufficiently 
sensitive to the solidarity effects of membership) to sustain their
participation and so p falls towards p a. For p < p c membership is
too small  to generate  sustainable  interest even amongst
individuals with relatively high levels of ei, i.e. who are highly 
sensitive to the solidarity effects derived from joining. If, in the
context of  Schelling's famous example, fewer than p c of the faculty 
attend the first seminar, then attendance will drop to zero in the
future. In the case of Figure 3.3(a), there are three equilibria: p = 
0, p = p a, P = Pc- The first two are (locally) stable, the third is 
unstable. If any proportion of the faculty greater than p c attends 
the first seminar, membership will settle at p a. p c, then, is the 
critical mass or threshold level of  membership. For a given e- 
dis t r ibut ion .  Figure 3.3(a) represents one of three possible 
outcomes consistent with equation (3.1). The other two cases are 
depicted in Figures 3.3(b) and 3.3(c). In each of these two cases the 
only stable equilibrium is at p = 0, where no collective action 
occurs. In the case of Figure 3.3(b) there is an addit ional  
equilibrium at p = p a, but this is clearly unstable.
The existence of stable equil ibrium levels of  collect ive 
action, therefore, depends upon the relative positions of the 
decision and distribution schedules. We can demonstrate this with 
some simple comparative static exercises.
(i) The more sensitive are individuals to solidarity effects 
the further to the right is the e-distribution with the consequences 
that the stable equil ibr ium level of non-zero membership is 
higher and the critical mass level is lower. This is shown in Figure 
3.4 where we see that 100% membership is now a stable 
equ i l ibr ium.
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Figure  3.4 Full participation equilibrium
(ii) If the cost to the individual of joining in collective action, 
d, rises then the decision schedule shifts to the right taking us 
from Case 3(a) to Case 3(c) through Case 3(b). The stable 
equilibrium level of p falls - eventually to zero.
(iii) If  the slope of  the distribution schedule  changes,  
reflect ing a different  degree of  heterogenei ty in ei across 
individuals, then the possible outcomes change. Let us consider 
what happens to collective action if, instead of individuals varying 
with respect to ei, all individuals are identical with ei  = e This is 
shown in Figure 3.5. The decision schedule still derives from 
equation (3.1) above.
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Figure 3.5 Homogeneous individuals.
We have assumed so far that an individual will join in 
collective action so long as the payoff from doing so is at least as 
great as that from not joining. In other words, if the two options 
have the same payoff the individual will join in the action. Thus 
when p = p a >n Figure 3.5 each individual has e = d/p and so all will 
join. Hence, p = p a is not an equilibrium. For later purposes it is 
useful to note now that point a would be descr ibed as an 
(unstable) equil ibrium had we adopted the assumption that 
individuals change their behaviour only if they can improve their 
payoff. That is, when the two payoffs are equal, individuals chose 
to maintain their previously selected behaviour instead of, when 
indifferent, opting to join the collective action. With such an 
assumption, when p = p a in Figure 3.5 and individuals are just 
indifferent between joining and not joining, it becomes the case 
that the proportion p a will continue to join. p a is unstable.
however, because if just one more individual joins (leaves) then 
the consequent ly  s t ronger (weaker)  solidari ty effects cause 
everyone to join (leave) the collective action. This outcome occurs 
because individuals are insufficiently heterogeneous with respect 
to the ej characteristic.  The result is described aptly by the 
aphorism. Birds of a feather flock together.'  Each individual has 
the same critical mass. This explains the result found by Booth 
(1985), as we shall explain in 3.4.(ii) below. It also enables us to 
understand better the properties and limitations of the model 
associated with Schelling. We turn now to show formally how the 
latter model is encompassed within the one we have developed in 
this section of the current chapter.
3 . 2 . ( i )  Sche l l in g ' s  model  o f  collective action.
Schelling’s model is common currency in explanations of 
collective action (see Schelling (1978), Hardin (1982) and Elster 
(1989)). The model provides a cogent method for understanding 
more clearly various important determinants of collective action. 
To illustrate the model  we consider the following example 
depicted in Figure 3.6.
3 6
Figure  3.6. The Schelling diagram.
The J-schedule represents the payoff to an individual who 
participates in the collective action. NJ refers to the non­
part icipat ion payoff  which is dependent  on the level of
participation through the solidarity effects. The two payoffs are 
equivalent to those in equation (3.1) above. The diagram shows us 
that if participation exceeds p* then joining is preferable to not 
joining and so the level of  collective action tends to unity. 
Conversely, if p < p* activity atrophies to zero. Following Schelling's 
assumption that individuals do not change their behaviour if they 
are indifferent between two actions, then p = p* is an equilibrium. 
However, it is unstable given the foregoing argument.
This model informs us, therefore, that if the payoffs to each 
individual are as represented above and if individuals are
identical then the only stable equil ibr ia  occur when either 
everyone cooperates in collective action or when no-one does. We
have shown in our more general model however that this
conclusion follows directly from the assumption of identical 
individuals. If instead individuals are sufficiently heterogeneous 
with respect to ej (or p*, in terms of the Schelling diagram) then 
stable intermediate equilibria are indeed possible. See Figure 
3.3(a) for such an example. The Schelling diagram can be seen as a 
special case within the more general model, occurring when ej = e. 
In his less formal analysis of critical mass models Schelling (1978, 
pp.91-110) discusses the cases in which different people have 
different cross-over points (or ei 's, or p*'s in the more formal 
models above). As demonstrated, our model is able to offer a 
rigorous framework for the discussion of these cases.
Our analysis shows how the possible types of  equilibrium 
level of collective action depend not only on the relative payoffs, 
but also on both the degree of heterogeneity within the population 
with respect to the cross-over point and the relative magnitudes 
of the dis t r ibut ion and decis ion schedule parameters .  In 
particular, we have shown that, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
heterogeneity reduces the size of  the critical mass required to 
sustain collective action. This is consistent  with the results 
obtained by Marwell, Oliver and Prahl (1988).
In the next section of this chapter we consider  ways in 
which the simple model which has been developed so far can be 
extended to cover other issues in the analysis of collective action.
3.3. Extensions of the  model
3.3.  ( i)  Genera l is ing the di s tr ibut ion and decis ion  
s c h e d u l e s
So far we have assumed that the decision schedule can be 
represented by a s imple hyperbol ic funct ion and that the 
distribution schedule is linear. The former assumption follows 
from the linearity of U jJ and UiNJ in p ,  and the latter from the 
assumption of uniformity in the distribution of ei. The model is 
robust  to changes in these assumptions. This has been shown 
elsewhere by Naylor and Cripps (1988)  for the particular 
application to the issue of trade union membership. For example, 
if we assume that ej has a distribution described by the general 
continuous density function f(ej), then we can see from Figure 3.7 
that the properties of the model are unaltered.
Figure 3.7, A non-uniform e-dist ribut ion.
The case represented in Figure 3.7 has the same properties as that 
depicted in Figure 3.3(a) for the uniform e-dis tr ibution.
3 .3 . ( i i )  S y m m e t r i c  r e p u ta t ion  e f f ec t s
When solidarity effects accrue equally to both joiners and 
non-joiners then we find that positive equi libr ium levels of 
collective action below 0.5 are not possible. The critical mass 
exceeds one-half. We represent symmetry of solidarity effects by 
amending equation (3.1) to:
Ui = w - dQ + ej{(iQ + ( l-n)(l -Q)}
Hence,
UiJ = w - d + ejp.
and
UiNJ= w + ei(l-p),
from which it can be seen that the utility from not joining is 
increasing in the proport ion (1 -p )  of non-joiners within the 
populat ion.
The individual will join if:
4 0
w - d + ej|i > w + ei( l-n)  
i.e., £j > d /(2p- l) .
The decision schedule now has an asymptote at p = 1/2, as in 
Figure 3.8 below.
Figure 3.8. Symmetric solidarity effects.
Consequently, the critical mass for membership exceeds one-half. 
More generally, whenever  the payoff  for non-membership is 
increasing in (1-p)  we observe a membership threshold strictly 
greater than zero.
3.3 . ( i i i )  Bel ievers  a n d  N o n -B e l i e v er s
In this sub-section we introduce into the analysis a more explicit 
role for belief in the social custom. Whereas so far the model has 
rested on solidarity-derived utility, there is now an influence of 
belief in or  commitment to the edict of the social custom. 
Arguably, this is consistent with Sen's (1977) argument that the 
concept of commitment might offer a solution to the free-rider 
problem. Individuals derive utility not only from conforming with 
the behaviour of others, but also from conformng to the moral 
dictate of a social custom: our rational economic agents have 
acquired a conscience to go with the herding instinct by which we 
have previously characterised them.
Fol lowing Akerlof (1980) we can dist inguish between 
believers and non-believers in the social norm or custom. Here we 
continue to specify the social norm as invoking individuals to join 
in the collect ive action, rather than free-riding. We re-write 
equation (3.1) as :
Uj = w - dQ + ejpQ - g(l-Q)b - h(l-Q)(l-b) (3.3)
We now interpret p as the proportion of individuals in the 
population who believe in the social custom.
b = 1 for an individual who is a believer
0 for a non-believer
4 2
g = the loss suffered by a believer who breaks the
social custom, where g > 0.
h = the corresponding loss suffered by a non­
believer, where g > h >0.
This approach is consistent with Elster's discussion (1989, pp. 105) 
where he argues that, "... one can define, discuss and defend a 
theory of  social norms within a wholly individualistic framework. 
A norm, in this perspective, is the propensity to feel shame and to 
anticipate sanctions by others at the thought of behaving in a 
certain forbidden way.” In Elster's terms we could think of ei as an 
indicator of shame and g or h as reflecting guilt which is 
independent  of the actions of  others as it is more deeply 
internal ised.
From equation (3.3) we can derive the joining condition for a 
believer:
b = 1 => UjJ = w - d + eip, an d
=s> UjNJ= w-g.
Hence,
UjJ 2 UjNJ iff ei S (d-g)/p.
That is, an individual who believes in the social custom will join if 
ei > (d-g)/p. Similarly, a non-believer will join if ej > (d-h)/p. We 
can now derive the equilibrium levels of collective action and 
belief in the social norm. Consider the case represented in Figure 
3.9.
Figure  3,9. Believers and non-believers.
If p = p a. then the believers are the individuals for whom Ei > E a . 
Any believer with ea S ea will join the collective action and as ea > 
ea this condition is satisfied for all believers. Additionally, there 
are some non-believers for whom ei £ ^a and hence who will join. 
Thus the proportion joining, say x, exceeds the proportion 
believing and, following Akerlof, we assume that the proportion 
believing rises: this can be justified by various arguments - in 
chapter 2 we discussed briefly the role of cognitive dissonance in 
this regard. In equil ibr ium p = t .  Hence, point a is not an 
equilibrium as x > p and p rises. In this way we can show that
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there is a stable equilibrium at p = r = 0 and two ranges of stable 
equilibria occurring between c and b and between d and f. The
ranges of equilibrium occur because of the distinction between 
believers and non-believers in the social custom. If, by setting
g=h, we collapse the model to the previous one where no such 
distinction is made, then the ranges reduce to single point 
equilibria. Conversely, as the difference between g and h grows 
then the ranges of stable equilibria widen. If h is sufficiently 
small, i.e. if non-believers suffer little or no disutility from free­
riding, then the interval b-d disappears and there is just one wide 
range of stable intermediate  equil ibr ia.  The implication of 
multiple ranges of equilibria is that we can become locked into 
lower levels of collective action than is otherwise achievable. A 
further implication is that there is no guarantee that the outcome
will in any sense be socially optimal.
This extension of  the model offers a possible escape from
the charges of 'structureless agency' or 'agentless structure’ (see 
Carling (1986)), or of reduction to either homoeconomicus or 
homosociologicus (Elster (1989)). This is because within the model 
it is clear that individuals'  actions are influenced both by self- 
interest and by social norms and that the pervasiveness of the 
social norm is itself affected by the actions of individuals. We do 
not have yet a theory of how social norms come into existence, but 
we do have a framework within which to study the endogeneity 
between individual actions, social norms and collective action.
3 .3 . ( i v )  The origin o f  collective action
There are two important ana related aspects of  collective 
action which have not yet been addressed in this chapter. The 
first concerns the motivation of latent collective action when p = 0 
is a stable equilibrium. Even if there exists a p* > 0 which is a 
potential stable equilibrium, such as point a in Figure 3.3(a) above, 
how might the outcome jump from p = 0 to p = p* ? Secondly, 
where does the social norm itself originate? One answer to the 
first question is given in 3.3.(v) below and involves Kantian 
behaviour by a subset of the population. Here we offer a different 
solution which we believe also goes part of  the way towards an 
answer to the second question.
Suppose that in some collective action context there is an 
initial payoff given by:
Uj = w + dQp.
Then the individual will join, independent of the level of p, so long 
as d > 0 . In other words, the individual has a dominant  
preference for joining independent of the actions of others. There 
is no free-rider incentive. The result is that all will join. An 
example of this is where a trade union is set up as a friendly 
society providing a private benefit which exceeds the private cost 
of membership, and which rises with p. Over time, however, the 
union might change its role to one of providing only a public good
46
(e.g. higher wages) and therefore risking the free-rider problem. 
[This could be plausibly argued to have characterised the 
historical development  of the British trade union movement  
during the period of the evolution of the welfare state. Neumann 
and Rissman (1984) have described this as a substitution effect on 
union membership.] In the absence of either reputation or social 
custom effects or of compulsion, membership will fall to zero as 
now each individual has a dominant preference to free-ride. The 
public good will not be provided because of the failure of 
collective action.
However, in the former regime in which the union is 
rewarding workers with pr ivate benefits there will be an 
incentive for the union leadership to anticipate the free-rider 
problem and hence inculcate members with a sense of duty to join 
in collective action rather than to free-ride. If the union is 
successful workers will internalise the emotions of shame or guilt 
associated with not joining and so the payoffs will come to 
correspond to those capable of sustaining membership or 
collective action at some positive level.
This argument  justifies the assumption that it might be 
possible to start at p = 1 rather than at p = 0 .  This would mean 
settling on an equilibrium at p = p a > 0 in Figure 3.3(a), for 
example, rather than being locked in at p = 0. As well as offering 
an explanation of the growth and persistence of organisations 
potentially susceptible to the free-rider problem, the model also
suggests a mechanism by which an identifiable and far-sighted 
group has an incentive to generate a particular social norm of 
group loyalty. What is lacking is an explanation of why individuals 
are amenable to any such edict or norm. This, however, is more 
the domain of social psychology.
3 . 3 . ( v )  Kan t ian  B e h a v i o u r
Consider again the s imple model represented in Figure 
3.3(a). It is clear that if we start at any level of p > p c then the 
outcome will tend towards p a . However, as p = 0 is a stable 
equilibrium, if we start with zero membership (or any value of p a 
< p c ) there will be no tendency for collective action to develop. 
There is scope here for collusion amongst p > p c individuals to 
initiate collective action. Alternatively, p = p a will occur so long as 
a proportion p > p c of the population consists of individuals whose 
participation is not conditional on participation by others. Such 
behaviour might be described as Kantian. This acts as a catalyst 
for cooperation by others and takes the outcome to p a . Such a 
trigger for collective action appears in a number of discussions 
(see Elster (1985, 1989) and Hardin (1982)).
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3.4 E m p i r i c a l  co n te n t  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n s
We have argued that the formal model presented here 
offers a more rigorous and richer framework within which to 
analyse the logic of collective action than do previous models. We 
also suggest that its capacity to generate empirically testable 
predictions is correspondingly larger. The model also bridges some 
of the gaps that have traditionally divided economics from other 
analyses within the social sciences. For  example, sociological 
literature has distinguished between the ' isolated mass'  and 
' integrated individuals'  (see Kerr and Seigel (1954)). The more 
isolated the mass the more we expect individuals to be influenced 
by group norms and reputation effects .  Within part icular  
empirical contexts we can identify different groups and rank them 
with respect to these characteristics and from our model make 
testable predictions about their behaviour. For instance, we would 
expect workers in industries like coal-mining to have stronger 
norms of group solidarity than workers in agriculture who are 
traditionally more integrated into their wider local communities. 
In terms of our model we translate this as meaning that the e- 
distribution schedule lies further to the right the more 'isolated' is 
the 'mass’ with stronger group norm effects pushing the decision 
schedule to the left. The results vary according to the specification 
of the parameters but generally predict higher levels of collective 
action, such as union membership or strike solidarity, amongst 
miners than amongst farmworkers. See Naylor (1989) for a fuller 
application of the model to strike activity and Naylor and Cripps
(1992) for the case of trade union membership. In Sections 3.4.(i) 
and 3.4.(ii), respectively, we review the application of the model 
which we have developed in this chapter to these two labour 
market contexts.
3 .4 . ( i )  S t r i ke  so l i dar i t y
An approach based on the analysis of social norms promises the 
possibility of an escape from the free-rider problem which, as we 
shall investigate throughout the course of this thesis, can be 
argued to have a number of labour market applications. The social 
custom model which we have developed in this chapter would 
seem to offer a useful framework for developing an explanation of 
a number of important aspects of workers'  behaviour towards 
industrial conflict. In part this is because a union strike call is 
highly vulnerable to the free-rider problem: a strike is expensive 
to individual workers in terms of forgone earnings, yet the 
benefits derived from any wage increase accrue to strikers and 
non-strikers alike. This begs the question, "Why, when a strike is 
called, do workers strike?" One possible answer would focus on 
compulsion or intimidation: but this would not seem plausible for 
the majority of peaceful strikes. An alternative is to hypothesise 
the existence of a social custom in the workplace discouraging 
workers from free-riding when a strike is called. This is consistent 
with the casual observation and sociological evidence of workplace 
mores invoking workers not to cross picket lines and of the often 
cultivated disapprobation of the values of the free rider.
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The issue of what determines an individual's behaviour with 
respect to a strike call is not simply of academic interest per se. 
The expectations held by both unions and employers regarding 
individual workers' responses to a strike call are likely to be a key 
factor in the bargaining process. Economic models of union decay 
functions (see, for example, Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969)) 
attempt to incorporate such information. The credibility of the 
union's strike call will depend on the parties'  perceptions of the 
likely solidarity rate (see Varoufakis (1989) for an exploration of 
this idea).
Naylor (1989) represents an application of the social custom 
model developed in this chapter to the issue of strike solidarity. 
In terms of equation (3.1), we can think of w as representing the 
income received by a non-striking worker, w-d as the income of a 
striker (e.g. strike pay by the union), p as the proportion who 
strike, e as the measure of individual sensitivities to solidarity- 
derived utility and s as equal to one if the worker strikes and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the results derived in Section 3.2 ot this Chapter 
carry over for the case of strike activity. The model is able to 
make sense of a number of policies adopted by employers and 
governments to reduce the probability of support for strikes. First, 
action taken to reduce the income received by strikers (i.e. to 
reduce w-d) will be likely to reduce the level of support for a 
strike: in terms of Figure 3.3(a) the decision schedule shifts to the 
right producing an increase in the critical threshold level of strike
solidarity, p.c , and a reduction in the stable equilibrium level of 
solidarity, p a , as discussed in 3.2.(ii). It would, of course, be 
surprising if an economic model failed to make this prediction. 
Second, and less banal, it is likely that attempts to challenge the 
moral legitimacy of a particular strike will reduce the support for 
a strike to the extent that such attempts reduce the disutilities 
incurred by disobedience. In terms of our formal model, loss of 
legitimacy is interpreted as a fall in g or h, with the consequence 
of a fall in equilibrium solidarity as examined in 3.3.(iii), above. 
Where the social custom is, as here, the invocation to strike, the 
employer or government might attempt to challenge the moral 
right to strike - as is often the case for workers in the 'caring' 
professions.
Third, the model predicts that a policy of exaggerating the 
numbers of workers ignoring the strike call will reduce support 
by weakening the perceived solidarity effects. During the 1984-85 
British coal dispute it was claimed on the strikers' side that many 
of the passengers on 'buses breaking through night-time picket 
lines were in fact 'mannequins'  or cardboard-cutouts and not 
strike-breakers at all. But then, according to our model, they 
would say that,  wouldn’t they? Similarly, it follows from the 
model that the striking unions would have incentives to both 
maximise strike pay and reinforce the sense of duty incumbent on 
members in rejecting the path of the free-rider.
Finally, it follows that the values of such parameters as e, g 
and h, inter alia, will vary both over time and across different 
groups of workers. In this way the social custom model can be 
seen as providing a potential meeting point with sociological 
theory and debate. For example, Kerr and Seigel's (1954) well- 
known distinction between the 'isolated mass' and the integrated 
individual'  can be translated into the language of our model. In 
explaining the inter-industry propensity to strike, the hypothesis 
of the location of the worker in society suggests, write Kerr and 
Seigel, that: "(a) industries will be highly strike-prone when the 
workers (i) form a relatively homogeneous group which (ii) is 
unusually isloted from the general community and which (ii) is 
capable of cohesion; and (b) industries will be comparatively 
strike-free when their workers (i) are individually in teg ra ted  
into the larger society, (ii) are members of trade groups which are 
coerced by government or the market to avoid strikes, or (iii) are 
so individually isolated that strike action is impossible." The 
isolated mass is said to possess its "own codes, myths, heroes and 
social standards." We might interpret the isolated mass as 
consisting of workers with high e values in groups characterised 
by large values for g and h, consequently generating typically 
high equilibrium values of p and 0 .
These predictions of the model are useful from the point of 
view of testing the model empirically. Given appropriate data 
from a lengthy strike conducted at a number of  establishments 
between a union and a firm, our model could be tested against a
number of predictions. The theory suggests that both high and 
quite low initial solidarity rates are sustainable over time, while 
intermediate initial rates will induce increasing support to some 
limit, and, conversely,  very low rates will tend to atrophy. 
Fu r th e rmore ,  su i t ab le  in fo rmat ion  about  the ind iv idua l  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  wou ld  enab le  p red ic t ions  ab o u t  which 
es tab l ishments  will  be characte r ised  by which type of
equilibrium. For example, p will be predicted to be higher in 
establishments characterised by close worker interactions (both at 
work and in terms of residence or social intercourse), by high 
strike pay and by a less paternalistic management, less able to 
establish social customs that compete with codes of union loylaty.
3 .4 . ( i i )  U n io n  m e m b e r s h ip
Booth (1985) develops a social custom model of union 
membership. In this model. Booth is able to explain for the first 
time in an economic model the existence of union membership in 
the absence of either compulsion or a pecun iary  private incentive 
good. This is an important development because it explains all 
those cases of 100% union membership in the absence of closed 
shop regulations. It probably also goes some way to explaining the
condit ions under which closed shop provisions migh t  have
evolved. Booth assumes that workers are identical with respect to 
their sensitivities to solidarity effects of the social custom, and 
hence we can represent that model in terms of Figure 3.5. Thus, 
we can see that the only stable equilibria in the Booth set-up
(and in many other European economies)  are characterised by 
intermediate levels of union membership - which would appear to 
be stable equilibria. This is clear from, for example, data from the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS).  Table 3.1 
presents WIRS (1984) information on union density for manual 
workers in private sector  establishments.
Table 3.1 Union Density by Bargaining Arrangement. 
(Manual Workers in Private Sector Establishments).
Union Density Non-Recog3 4Recog Manrec Shop Total
(D)
D=0 185 0 0 0 185
0<D<10 20 14 0 1 35
10<D<20 1 0 8 2 0 20
20<SD<30 1 1 1 2 1 1 24
30t£D<40 2 10 2 2 1 6
40sD<50 4 2 1 4 1 30
50<D<60 2 1 6 1 1 20
60iSD<70 4 28 4 3 39
70sD<80 1 3 1 1 1 7 50
80<D<90 0 10 6 9 25
90sD<100 2 37 3 1 30 100
D=100 4 1 4 7 4 217 309
245 201 136 272 854
. . . . . . __ __ . . .
Source: WIRS4. 1984.
3Non-Recog refers to establishments in which unions are not recognised. 
Recog to est.s in which there is merely recognition, Manrec to those union- 
recognised est.s in which management recommends workers to join a union 
and Shop refers to the existence of closed shop provisions.
4WIRS refers to the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey.
The final column in Table 3.1 shows that of the 854 private 
sector establishments selected from the 1984 WIRS data set, 
union density among manual workers was either zero or 100% in 
185 and 309 establishments, respectively. Thus in 42% of cases 
union density is at some intermediate level. There are a number 
of interesting aspects to the Table calling for closer attention. First, 
the presence of a closed shop does not imply that union density is 
necessarily close to 100%. In the case of very low membership, at 
least, this is likely to be attributable either to the closed shop 
explicitly covering only some groups of an establishment's manual 
workers, or to part-time workers not joining the union. Second, 
the Table demonstrates how density can be high [in some cases up 
to 100%) even in establishments where unions are not recognised 
for bargaining purposes. Third, for manual  workers across 
establishments where there is union recognition but neither a 
closed shop nor a recommendation by management that workers 
join a union, the modal level of union density is over 90% and the 
median is over 50%, but each density level is well-represented in 
the distribution.
For non-manual workers, it is also true that each density 
level is well-represented across establishments where unions are 
merely recognised. However, mode and median density levels are 
lower than for manual workers. Table 3.2 shows the data for non­
manuals .
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Table 3.2 Union Density by Bargaining Arrangement.
(N o n - M a n u a l  W o r k e r s  in P r i v a t e  S e c t o r  E s t a b l i s h m e n t s ) .
Union Density Non-Recog Recog Manrec Shop Total
(D)
D=0 393 0 0 0 393
0<D<10 1 1 20 1 0 32
10<D<20 1 4 2 1 2 3 40
20<D<30 5 3 1 4 2 42
30<D<40 6 2 2 6 1 35
40<D<50 5 4 1 7 1 54
50<D<60 3 38 1 6 8 65
60<D<70 1 26 9 8 44
70<D<80 0 30 1 5 1 6 6 1
80<D<90 0 1 3 1 5 1 3 4 1
90<D<100 2 1 4 3 9 3 8
D=100 5 1 0 1 8 27 6 0
445 266 106 88 905
Source: WIRS. 1984.
We conclude from this evidence that it is not valid to depict 
the British labour market as dichotomised neatly into union and 
non-union sectors. Nor, from the data, does it seem reasonable for 
economists to develop economic theories of trade unions under 
the exclusive assumption of the closed shop, as is typically the 
case. If we take the open shop to include establishments where 
unions are recognised and where there may or may not be a 
management recommendation on membership, but where there is 
no closed shop, then we can see from Table 3.1 that for manual
workers 55% of union shops are open and 45% are closed. For non- 
manual workers, 81% of union shops are open and 19% closed. The 
challenge for the economist, then, is to develop a theory of the 
trade union which allows for the possibility of the open shop 
union recrui ting voluntary m em bers  and recording stable 
in termediate  levels of membership.  This is given greater 
importance as legislation is passed to limit the extent of the closed 
shop. It is on the basis of its ability to explain these phenomena, 
as we have seen in this chapter, that we feel the social custom 
model provides important insights into the determinants of 
individual union membership and establishment union density. 
We defer further discussion of union membership until the next
chapter, as that chapter will build further on the social custom 
model of union membership.
3.5 C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a formal model of collective action 
which brings together features associated in particular with the
work of Elster, Schelling and Akerlof. We would argue that the 
model is capable of application to a wide range of empirical
contexts involving issues of collective action where the free-rider
problem renders conventional  economic analysis inadequate.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will be chiefly concerned with exploring such
applications. The approach offers insights into the historical
development  of such groups as trade unions and could be
empirically tested against such processes. As Hardin (1982) has
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shown the results obtained here can carry over from the issue of 
collective action to that of the multi-person prisoners' dilemma.
A number of  aspects of the model deserve further  
development. Here we indicate two such aspects. First, we have 
t reated the ei d i s t r ib u t io n  as de te rm ined  e x o g e n o u s ly .  
Alternatively, we could follow Jones (1984) and make our ei 
parameter endogenous within the model. One way of doing this 
would be to make Ej i tself dependent upon the individual 's  
decision with respect to membership of collective action. Or we 
could think of the individual as influenced by a vector of social 
norms with his/her attitude to each affected through ej by his/her 
behaviour with respect to the others. Second, we have abstracted 
from the economic structure or game in which the collective action 
is, or is not, taking place. Clearly, a complete model needs to 
specify the interactions between the economic parameters and the 
social custom influences on collective action. In subsequent  
chapters we shall be concerned with the task of integrating the 
social custom model with more traditional approaches within 
economic analysis.  In chapter  4 our context  will be the 
determinants of trade union density.
C h a p t e r  4 An Economic Theo ry  of the O pen  Shop T rade  
U n i o n .
In this chapter we attempt to build on the social custom model 
developed in Chapter 3. In Section 3.4.(ii) of that chapter we 
offered an application of the collective action social custom model 
to the issue of union membership.  The model we developed 
however was essentially devoid of economic structure. It could be 
depicted as a (rather crude) sociological story written in the 
language of orthodox economics. In the current chapter we aim to 
apply our social custom analysis to the more traditional concerns 
of economists focussing on the impact of trade unions on wage 
determination through bargaining. We argue that this integration 
of our model with the more mainstream economic theory of the 
trade union enables us to address various issues usually outside 
the scope of economic analysis.
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
There has been significant interest in recent years both in 
the empirical investigation of the determinants of  trade union 
membership, in the UK and elsewhere, and in the theoretical 
analysis of the economic effects of the closed shop trade union.
However, there is little rigorous microeconomic explanation of 
union membership which is relevant for much of the UK and 
similar labour markets where the 'open shop' union is prevalent, 
as we saw from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the previous chapter. This 
chapte r  a t tempts to overcome the f ree -r ider  prob lem of 
explaining union membership in the open shop in a context of 
union-firm bargaining. We argue that both private pecuniary 
gains and social  influences affect the individuals '  union 
membership decisions, citing evidence in support of these basic 
assumptions. We show that stable intermediate union density is a 
possible equilibrium outcome in a generalised social custom model 
in which we analyse the simultaneous determination of wages and 
union membership,  deriving a number o f  comparative static 
results. In particular, we find that both wages and union density 
depend upon, inter alia, the level of strike pay, the net cost of 
union membership and the individuals'  sensi t ivi ty to social 
custom and associated solidarity effects. We argue that the 
approach is consistent with various stylised facts concerning both 
wage bargaining and union membership and is able to explain a 
number of otherwise puzzling features of union membership.
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The behaviour of aggregate union density both over time 
and across countries has been the subject of much economic 
debate in recent years. This is not surprising given the extensive 
evidence, both theoretical and empirical, of the key importance of 
unions in the determination of wages, employment  and economic
performance.  Freeman (1989)  analyses  the d ivergence  in 
aggregate union density across developed countries over time, 
whilst Dickens and Leonard (1985) and Neumann and Rissman
(1984) study the decline in union membership in the US which 
was so marked in the period 1955 to 1980. For the UK, there has 
been a vigorous debate on the causes of the quite dramatic fall in 
aggregate union density through the 1980s [see Freeman and 
Pelletier (1990), Disney (1990) and Carruth and Disney (1988)]. In 
addition to this empirical focus on aggregate union membership, 
there have been important micro-econometric studies both at the 
level of the individual worker [for the UK, see Bain and Elias
(1985) , Booth (1986) and Green (1990)] and at the establishment 
level [see Bain and Elsheikh (1980)].
Despite this large empirical  l iterature ,  microeconomic 
theories of the trade union have had relatively little to say about 
the determination of union density among the firm's workforce. 
Most models adopt the implicit assumption that the firm confronts 
a trade union which carries the force of a closed shop and which 
bargains on behalf of a fixed level of membership which always 
exceeds the employment  level in the bargained outcome. Carruth 
and Oswald (1987) have shown that if employment  exceeds 
membersh ip  then union  p refe rences ,  and hence  wage- 
employment outcomes, are affected. In the present chapter we 
move away from both the fixed membership and closed shop 
assumptions to develop a model in which the level of union
membership at the establishment is determined endogenously 
with the wage.
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There have been previous theoretical attempts to explain 
the level of union membership at the level of the aggregate 
macroeconomy. Grossman (1983) develops a theoretical model to 
explain the simultaneous determination of wages and aggregate 
union membership. This model has been adapted by Disney and 
Mudambi (1990) and provides the basis for their empirical work 
on aggregate UK union density. The Grossman model, however, is 
built on the assumption of an aggregate labour market which can 
be dichotomised neatly into a union and a non-union sector.
As we indicated in the previous chapter, this segmentation 
is unsatisfactory in labour markets, such as that in the UK, where 
it is not the case that establishments can be partitioned into those, 
on the one hand, in which unions are not recognised and there are 
no union members [a non-union sectorl and those, on the other 
hand, in which there is a union closed shop with full membership 
[a - monopoly - union sector]. Evidence from the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys [WIRS] of 1980 and 1984 [see 
Millward and Stevens (1986) for details of the surveys) suggests 
that it is not valid to depict the British labour market in this way. 
Using WIRS 1984 and focussing on private sector establishments, 
Gregg and Naylor (1991) show that, for manual workers, fewer
than half of  establishments in which a union is recognised are 
character ised by closed shop arrangements.  For non-manual 
w orke rs ,  more than  f o u r - f i f t h s  of  r e c o g n i s e d - u n i o n  
establishments are 'open shops', in the sense of management  
recognising a union for the purposes of bargaining over pay and 
other conditions of work but where there is no closed shop. 
Furthermore, within open shops the evidence is that union density 
varies quite evenly between zero and 100% membership.
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The challenge for the economist, then, is to develop a theory 
of the trade union which allows for the possibility of  the open 
shop trade union with intermediate levels of union density. This is 
given greater importance in the UK as legislation is passed to limit 
the extent of the closed shop.
The specific problem for the economist is to explain why any 
individual would join an open shop trade union in the face of the 
free-rider incentive not to join the union. Given that any union- 
negotiated wage accrues both to union members and to non- 
members in the workplace, the wage outcome is a public good and 
hence the individual's dominant strategy is to free-ride. Yet, while 
free-riding certainly does occur, as the WIRS information implies, 
open shops do exist and are characterised by varying degrees of 
union density. Given this variation it is surprising that economists 
have had relatively little to say about the union open shop. This
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concern is likely to be relevant for a number of European 
economies, especially for those in which coverage of union- 
negotiated pay deals exceeds  membership.  Further, wherever 
there is local negotiation, the level of union density in the 
establishment is likely to have important implications for union 
bargaining power and thereby influence the union wage mark-up 
and the pattern of union strike activity, amongst other things. For 
example, in the extreme case where membership is close to zero it 
is likely that the union will be unable to influence the wage 
outcome. We return to this point in Section 4.4 of the chapter.
Summarising the discussion in the previous chapter, we saw 
how, in order to escape the free-rider paradox in circumstances 
characterised by the prisoners' dilemma, Olson (1965) argued that 
collective action will occur  only if there is either compulsion 
[analogous in our context to the closed shop or to intimidatory 
pressure to join] or an incentive private good. Booth (1985) 
interprets the incentive private good as being the reputation' 
utility that derives f rom complying with a social custom of 
membership. This idea s tems from Akerlof (1980) who defines a 
social custom as "an act whose utility to the agent performing it in 
some way depends on the beliefs or actions of other members of 
the community." In the context of union membership the social 
custom can be best thought of as urging workers not to take a 
free-ride. The Booth model is able to show that a union can exist 
despite the potential free-rider problem. However, the only stable
non-zero level of  union density occurs when everyone joins the 
union. There is no stable intermediate equilibrium level of 
density,  which means that most  open shop cases remain 
unexplained. The reason for this result lies in the assumption that 
workers are homogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to the 
solidarity effects. In the previous chapter we demonstrated the 
formal equivalence of the Booth model and the 'critical mass' or 
'tipping' models developed by Schelling (1978). The purpose of 
the current chapter is to extend previous work in two directions. 
First, we examine union membership in a critical mass framework 
in which individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous and in 
which (a) the utility function is more general than that specified 
in Chapter 3 and (b) the distribution schedule is more general. We 
show that this enables us to explain not only the existence of the 
open shop but also of intermediate membership densities and 
generates a dependence of membership on the wage level. Second, 
we attempt to integrate the social custom approach with more 
traditional economic arguments in a model in which union density 
and wages are determined endogenously .  We then derive 
comparative static results and consider the empirical content and 
implications of the properties of the model.
The plan of the rest of the chapter is as follows. In the next 
Section we review the empirical evidence on why workers join 
unions and argue for the relevance of the social custom approach. 
In Section 4.3 we develop a generalised social custom model of
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trade union membership and, in Section 4.4, we analyse the effect 
of union density on the wage outcome. Section 4.5 then brings 
together the analyses of union density and the wage and considers 
the properties and empirical content of  the model. Section 4.6 
summarises our main conclusions.
4 . 2  Why w o rk e rs  join  unions:  som e  evidence
There are a number of reasons why, for some workers, the 
free-rider incentive is overcome by the presence of private 
incent ive goods associated with membersh ip ,  in the way 
suggested by Olson. For a number of unions in Western Europe, 
trade union members receive: better protection against unfair 
dismissal and against other  gr ievances,  better access  to 
information about employment rights and, in parts of Scandinavia, 
receive supplementary unemployment  insurance through the 
trade union. Private incentive goods are an increasing feature in 
the US, where there has been an emergence of associate 
membership programmes encouraging workers not represented 
by unions in collective bargains to join union schemes offering 
private consumer benefits only. Jarley and Fiorito (1990) argue 
that this raises fundamental questions about the producer role 
and the group orientation of labour unions and runs contrary to
the view of early theorists - such as Perlman (1928) - who argued 
that; "unionism serves the wants and needs of individuals and 
groups at the same time." According to Perlman, argue Jarley and 
Fiorito, " 'real unionism' recognised the need for collectivism, or 
solidarity, and the need to stress ' shop rights’ rather than the 
interests of  indivduals as consumers."  Associate membership 
schemes represent a move in the direction of the latter.
A large number of studies and surveys have indicated, 
however, that both private benefits and social custom effects are 
at work in inducing union membership. This is consistent with our 
model - even if private benefits provide the dominant motivation 
for joining, so long as it is not the case that private benefits alone 
exceed the costs of joining. So long as there is some, at least 
marginal, role - and we believe the evidence below suggests there 
is a strong role - for social custom effects to influence the 
individual's membership decision, then worker's decisions will be 
interdependent and our framework will be a relevant one.
In an early and classic study,  Rees (1962), cit ing the 
evidence for the US of Seidman, London and Karsh (1951), 
observes that grievance procedures provide a primary motive for 
union membership, but includes as important factors the worker's 
background of union or radical activity in the family or in 
previous employment . He detects the influence of a "general
pressure for conformity" with workers often reporting that, "they 
joined largely because it was the normal thing to do in this plant - 
because almost everyone else was a member." Maranto and Fiorito
(1987) examine the determinants of NLRB certification election 
outcomes between 1972 and 1980 and find that "benefits 
provided directly to members by unions significantly increase, 
and higher  dues significantly reduce, white-collar  organising 
success, whereas the same factors have no significant effect on 
blue-collar organising." Montgomery (1989) cites early studies by 
Chamberlin (1935) and Bakke (1945) which found that normative 
influences [how workers thought that others, such as co-workers 
and family, wished them to behave and how strongly they were 
inclined to satisfy these wishes] played a strong role in the union 
membership decis ion.  This finding was re- inforced by later 
studies of government employee union membership decisions 
conducted by Gordon and Long (1981). Montgomery's study 
investigates determinants of union representation election voting 
decisions - as opposed to the membership decision which is more 
public and therefore potentially more susceptible to normative 
inf luences - and finds that normative pressures are still 
influent ial .
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In Britain, too, a variety of  sources confirms the importance 
of both pr ivate  and co l lect ive  motivat ions behind union 
membership. The British Social Attitudes 7th Report by Jowell. 
Witherspoon, Brook and Taylor (1990) indicates the prevalence of
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the open shop - over two-thirds of the union members surveyed 
were not covered by any closed shop arrangements - and 
examines the reasons given for belonging to a trade union. They 
report that the two most widely endorsed reasons are; "to protect 
me if problems come up" [rated as important by over 90% of 
members] and "to get higher pay and better working conditions" 
[80%]. Of course, the latter motive is potentially vulnerable to the 
free-rider incentive and indicates that the survey question does 
not rigorously disentangle 'reasons for belonging' from reasons 
why one should belong'. Nevertheless, the results are informative 
and underl ine the s ignificance of private benefi ts  in the 
membership calculation. Indeed, 71% of members responded that 
"to get members' benefits" was an important reason for joining. 
Less self-regarding reasons for membership also emerge from the 
report as important and suggest the significant influence of peer 
pressure to adhere to the collective principles of trade unionism. 
"To help other people I work with" was regarded as an important 
reason for membership by 76%, with "I believe in them in 
principle" [67%] and "Most of my colleagues are members" [55%). 
Furthermore, 15% felt that "It's a tradition in my family" was an 
important reason for membership. This latter finding is consistent 
with other studies [e.g. de Witte (1989), Gallie (1989) and van der 
Vail (1970)] which have found that union members are more 
likely to have had union-active parents. Hartley (1991) argues 
that social influences are important and cites van der Vail's 
conclusion that, "Many workers join the union in order to occupy a 
psychologically safe position among the members of their group,
i.e. in order not to be isolated or despised as a 'parasite' [a free­
rider, in our terminology|. Evidence of this is that 82% of blue- 
collar and 81% of white-collar workers mentioned persons in their 
immediate environment who had influenced their decision to join. 
Since 32% and 38%, respectively, gave such influence as their 
basic motive, it may be concluded that at least one-third join 
mainly on account of the convictions of others." Hartley adds that 
social influence can be more benign than might be inferred, 
involving exposure to arguments about the role and purpose of 
trade unions, or increasing the att ract iveness of social group 
membership and social identity.
Our main argument, then, is that whilst  private incentive 
goods might provide an important - and for some workers the 
single-most important - reason for an individual worker to belong 
to a trade union, the evidence suggests an important role for the 
influence of social customs in the workplace.  So long as this 
influence affects the individual worker's membership decision - 
even if only at the margin, as we shall explain more fully in the 
next Section - then workers' decisions will be interdependent and 
hence the 'critical mass' arguments that we shall develop will be 
appropriate. In focussing on the social context of the individual's 
membership decision, our model differs f rom explanations of 
union membership which are based solely on an individualistic 
calculation of financial costs and benefits [see Hirsch and Addison 
(1986) ch. 2]. In this latter tradition Blanchflower, Crouchley,
Estrin and Oswald (1989) have argued that workers pay the 
certain cost of joining unions in order to receive the uncertain 
benefits of, for example,  protection from unfair dismissal.  
Consequently, it is differing personal characteristics,  such as 
attitudes to risk, which explain membership status. Against this, 
we regard as indirect support for our approach the common 
finding from econometric studies of union membership that the 
individual 's observed personal characteris tics are surprisingly 
insignificant determinants of union status [see Bain and Elias 
(1985), Booth (1986) and Green (1990)]. Similarly, Guest and 
Dewe (1988)  conclude that the extent of union organisation 
depends less on personal character is tics  and more on the 
charac ter is t ics  of the job and other workplace features.  
Furthermore, in their classic study of why workers vote for union 
representation in NLRB elections in the US, Farber and Saks 
(1980) found that after controlling for the effects on unionisation 
of various aspects of the employment  relationship, individual 
characteristics such as sex and education have little relationship 
with voting behaviour. We would argue that these findings are 
consistent with the theory that it is the social customs and related 
workplace character is tics  which shape the individual 's union 
membership decision. Further support for this approach comes 
from Green (1990) who finds that region, after controlling for 
industrial composi tion,  is an important determinant  of union 
presence because it, "...is the region of work which reflects the 
histories and polit ico-economic cultures of each part of the 
country." Our own work can, perhaps, be best thought of as an
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attempt to provide a theoretical framework which encompasses 
both t radi t iona l  economic  a rguments  and the empir ical  
observations surveyed briefly above.
4 . 3  A general i sed social custom model  of  union 
m e m b e r s h i p
The model in this chapter represents an attempt to explain 
how the union membership decisions of individual workers are 
influenced by social custom effects in the workplace as well as by 
private cost-benefit considerations, including the wage level. We 
assume that there is a social custom which invokes workers to join 
a trade union rather than to free-ride. A worker who conforms 
with this invocation derives a utility from doing so which depends 
positively upon the proportion of all workers who conform. 
Individual workers are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect 
to their sensitivity to this solidarity-derived utility. With this 
assumption, we are able to show stable equilibrium levels of 
union membership in the workplace. This part of the model is a 
generalisation of that developed in Chapter 3. Here we allow for a 
flexible functional forms and for the possibility that individuals 
acquire solidarity benefits from non-union membership. We then
consider how the results of the model vary when we relax this 
latter assumption.
Let an individual's preferences be described by:
U = U(y) + aV(p, e)
where we have kept the notation as consistent as possible with 
that in the previous chapter.
The individual 's preferences are separable and the first 
term is a strictly increasing concave function of income, y; hence 
U y > 0 .  U y y < 0 .  As will become apparent, preferences over W and d 
are no longer separable This is a considerable departure from the 
equivalent assumption in Chapter 3 - the implication this will be 
that W no longer necessarily drops out of the analysis of  union 
membership.  The second term represents utility gained from 
conforming to a social custom; whether the custom is membership 
or non-membership is immaterial as, initially and for generality, 
we allow for solidarity effects to accrue within both conforming 
and non-conforming groups. The utility gained is dependent on a 
taste parameter, e, which describes an individual's benefits from 
conforming to group behaviour. We assume V(.,0) = 0 and V(.) 
increases in e, Ve > 0. The parameter p represents the proportion of
the population conforming to the social custom and we assume 
also that V(.) increases in p; V(i > 0. We will also assume V^e £ 0;
that is, an increase in p generates a larger increase in utility the 
larger is e and a form of Inada condition which says that as the 
taste parameter e becomes arbitrarily large so the marginal
benefit from an increase in the proportion of the population 
abiding by the custom also becomes large implies V^-»°°).
The parameter  a  on the second term will facili tate later
comparative statics analysis on varying the strength of social 
custom effects. As we are concerned with union membership, let 
p be the proportion of the population who join the trade union at 
the establishment and. hence, 1-p do not join. Let w be the wage 
rate (which is independent  of  the individual ' s union status
because of the large numbers public goods characteristics of the 
wage) and let d be the net pecuniary cost of union membership.
If d is negative then there is no free-rider incentive and the social 
custom arguments of our model are superfluous. We assume that 
d is positive and hence that solidarity effects, at least at the 
margin, influence the membership decision. Notice that this is 
quite consis tent  with any empir ical  evidence that private 
incentive goods are more important than solidarity/social custom 
motivations for membership. The payoffs from membership and 
non-membership are as follows.
UJ = U(W - d) + a V (p ,  e) ( m e m b e r s h ip )
UNJ = U(W) + aV (l-  n. e) (n o n -m e m b e r s h ip )
An individual is indifferent between joining and not joining a 
union if UJ = UNJ, or
0 < U ( W )  - U ( W - d )  = a[V(p,  e) - V( l - p ,  e)] (4.1)
i.e..
Z = UJ - UNJ = 0.
Define p(e,a,d,W) to be the value of p which satisfies equation (4.1) 
for given values of e, a, d and W. From our assumptions on V(.) it 
is clear that the solution to (4.1) defines a strictly decreasing 
schedule in ( p , e )  - space. As p tends to 0.5 from above the RHS of 
(4.1) tends to zero, hence successively higher values of e are 
necessary to preserve equality. The RHS of (4.1) increases in e 
because as V^e > 0 and p > 1 - p it must be the case that as e 
increases the first term rises by more than the second declines 
(these assertions are proved formally below). We can graph this 
relationship, as demonstrated by the Z = 0 schedule (henceforth, 
the Z-schedule) in Figure 4.1.
Figu re  4.1 The Z-schedule p(a,e,d,W)
By differentiating (4.1), the equation defining the Z- 
schedule, implicitly with respect to the parameters e, a .  d and W, 
we can calculate precisely how the decision schedule shifts in 
response to a change in each of these parameters,
dp _ Ve(l - p , e ) - V e(p.e)  > 0  i f ^ > >5 
de V^(l  - p, e) + V^(p, e)
dp V(1 - p, e) - V(p, e) 
d a  aV^( l  - p, e) + aV^(p,  e)
(4.2)
(4.3)
dp _ Uw(W) - Uw(W - d) rQ 
dW a V ^ t  - p, e) + a V M(p, e)
(4.4)
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dp Uw(W - d)  ^ Q
d d  aV^(l  - p, e) + aV^fp, e)
(4.5)
In the figure the Z-schedule is shown as a convex function. This 
need not in general be true. However, to simplify the analysis we 
will assume henceforth that p(e) is a convex function. This can be 
sustained if, for example, V(p,e) = pe.  Workers are heterogeneous 
with respect to their sensitivity to solidarity-derived utility. We 
assume that the characteristic e has a distribution described by a 
twice continuously differentiable distribution function, f(e.0), on 
the interval 0 < e < e\.  The parameter 0 is used to represent shifts 
in the distribution of e, and we will assume that as 0 increases so 
the distribution function f(e,0) shifts to the right; t'e < 0 . Thus, an 
increase in 0 represents an unambiguous shift in the distribution 
of the characteristic towards those who are more inclined to value 
social customs. To ensure a unique interior equilibrium we will 
also assume for simplicity that fee>0 if f <1/2, thus the distribution 
function is convex in its lower regions. In Figure 4.2 we give the 
e-distribution schedule. It emerges as a property of the model that 
if there are both members and non-members in the population 
(i.e., 0 < p < 1), then the latter group consists of  individuals with 
the lower values of e. When p = 0.25, for example, the group of 
joiners is represented by the highest quartile in the (0, e i ) 
interval. We can now investigate the equilibrium properties of 
the model. Consider points m, n, p and q in Figure 4.2.
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F i g u re  4.2 Distribution and Z-schedules: p(e,a.W.d) and 
l-f(e.e)
At point p in Figure 4.2 there are p P joiners in the union, for 
whom e P < e < Ej. The position of the Z-schedule tells us that any 
individual with e > ep will prefer to join the union. Point p, then,
does not represent an equilibrium, as those non-joiners for whom 
e > Ep would prefer to join the union. Our assumption is that
membership will grow in this situation. Similarly, point p.m does
not constitute an equilibrium level of union membership: of the 
p m joiners there is a proportion for whom e < em i.e., less than the
density level needed to sustain their membership. From point m, 
then, we would expect membership to fall. It becomes clear that 
the [locally| stable equilibria in Figure 4.2 are at point n, to which 
membership falls from unity and rises from levels such as p P, and
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at p = 0 ,  to which membership falls from levels such as p m. Point q 
also represents an equilibrium, in the Nash sense that no-one 
would have an incentive to change their behaviour if, for some 
reason, membership happened to be at this level. But it is not a 
stable equil ibrium as only a small drop in membership is 
necessary to induce density to unravel to zero, and only a small 
rise would generate increasing membership to point  n. The 
membership level at point q, p q say, represents a threshold level
of membership which a union must achieve in order for union 
membership to be self-sustaining. If this threshold level is 
exceeded then membership will rise to reach the level. p n say,
associated with point n in Figure 4.2. For these reasons we will call
point n the solidarity-equilibrium level of membership and point 
q the threshold level of membership. Both the equilibrium and the
threshold levels of membership are therefore defined by the
intersection of the Z-schedule and the distribution schedule, these 
two points are therefore characterized as the two solutions (£*,p*)  
to the equations
1 - f( e*,0 ) = p(e*,a,d,W), p*=p(e*,a,d,W ).
From this it is clear that both the solidarity equilibrium and the 
threshold levels of membership will depend upon the parameter 
values in the Z- and distribution schedules. We now consider how 
the equilibrium and threshold levels are affected by changes in 
the parameters.
8 0
P r o p e r t y  4 .1a  Effects o f  changes in W and  d.
From equation (4.4) it is clear that the Z-schedule shifts to 
the right as the wage decreases. Hence, point n in Figure 4.2 
moves down the distribution schedule implying a lower solidarity 
equilibrium membership level. If wages fall sufficiently the Z- 
schedule will lie everywhere to the right of the distribution 
schedule and the only equilibrium will be at p=0. From this we can 
see that there will be some critical wage level. Wcrit, which, 
ceteris paribus, will be just sufficient to induce an intermediate 
solidarity equilibrium, p Crii- This will occur at the tangency point 
of the distribution and Z- schedules. The relevant derivatives are 
calculated below. Notice again that for the threshold level the
denominator will be positive and for the equilibrium level the 
denominator will be negative. As the wage rises above Wcrit the 
Z-schedule shifts to the left and the solidarity equilibrium density 
level increases. This is shown in Figure 4.3. Changes in d. the net 
cost of membership, have the opposite effects to those for changes 
in W. An increase in d will cause an upward shift in the p ( W )  
schedule.
8 1
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Figure  4 .3  Solidarity-equilibrium union density
increases with the wage above the 
critical level.
P r o p e r t y  l b  A sym m etry  o f  so lidar ity  e ffec ts .
It is clear from Figure 4.2 that the critical level of union 
membership exceeds 50% membership.  This follows from the 
assumption that non-members derive utility from the solidarity 
effects within the group of non-members, to the same extent that 
solidarity effects accrue within the group of members. This is 
perhaps an extreme case. The moral sanction associated with 
breaking the social custom of not free-riding is likely to generate 
stronger solidarity effects for union joiners and this would push 
down the asymptote on the membership decision schedule below 
the 50% mark. In the limit, it will fall to zero if there are no
solidarity effects within the group of non-members. Even with no 
solidarity effects amongst non-joiners, the zero asymptote on the 
decision schedule would produce some positive value for the 
threshold density level and therefore in a qualitative sense our 
results are not sensitive to the assumption of symmetry or
asymmetry.  We adopt the initial assumption of symmetry in
solidarity-derived utility for the purpose of  generality and to be 
able to establish this point.
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P r o p e r t y  lc  A change in 6.
An increase in 6, the group’s propensity to value solidarity 
effects - that is a general shift to the right of the e-dis tr ibution 
would raise the solidarity-equilibrium level of membership Ipoint 
n in Figure 4.2) and reduce the threshold level of union density. 
Hence, an increase in 0 will shift the p(W) schedule down and to 
the right, implying a higher solidarity equilibrium level for a 
given W, and a lower W cr jt . If the shift to the right of the 
distribution schedule is sufficiently great then the model would 
predict 100% membership. Conversely, a sufficiently large shift to 
the left, reflecting low importance of solidarity effects, could 
produce an outcome in which the only equilibrium is at zero 
mem bersh ip .
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P r o p e r t y  Id A change in a .
The effects of changes in the parameter a ,  which represents 
individual sensitivity to social custom or solidarity effects,  are 
similar to the effects of a change in 0. As a  increases this will in 
general shift the Z-schedule downwards, hence the threshold 
value for stable union membership will decrease as the solidarity- 
equilibrium level increases, producing a downward shift in the 
p(W) schedule. If the variance of the distribution diminishes, but 
with constant mean, the position of the equilibria will also change. 
In the limit,  as individuals  become identical,  the stable 
intermediate equilibrium vanishes and the only stable equilibria 
imply that everyone behaves identically - either everyone joins or 
no-one does. This is the special case of identical individuals 
discussed by Booth (1985) and can explain the existence of a 
union but does not provide an explanation of the intermediate 
density levels characterising the open shop trade union which is a 
part of the focus of our analysis.
In this Section, then, we have shown how in our model 
union density in the establishment depends, ceteris paribus, upon 
the wage level: there being a minimum critical wage necessary to 
induce a solidari ty equi l ibr ium, with the level of  union 
membership in such an equilibrium increasing with the wage
above the critical level. The membership schedule, p(W) in Figure 
4.3, showing the dependence of the solidarity equilibrium on the 
wage level, shifts with changes in the other parameters of the 
social custom model which we have developed, as discussed 
above. We turn now to examine the influence of union density on 
the wage level.
4 . 4 .  W age  d e t e r m i n a t i o n
We have shown in Section 4.3 how union membership in the 
establishment is likely to vary with the wage. In this section we 
consider how the wage level might be affected by the level of 
union density.
There is a class of theoretical models which attempt to 
model union membership and wage determination endogenously, 
but these tend to assume a closed shop trade union. A common 
assumption is that membership equals employment. Thus, whilst 
there is, in these models, a rigorous microeconomic explanation of 
the wage choice by the union, usually generated in a median voter
model of union behaviour, the explanation of union membership is 
more ad hoc.
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In order to generate a relationship for wages as a function of 
membership,  there are two main alternat ive approaches one 
might take. First, one could develop a median voter monopoly 
union model relating how the union's preferred wage varies with 
membership. This would be consistent with Grossman (1983) and 
Booth and Chatterji  (1992).  However,  the monopoly union 
assumption that the union is free to set the wage level would 
seem more appropriate to the case of the closed shop. For our 
purposes, we prefer to follow an alternative approach. We argue 
that in the open shop trade union context it is more appropriate to 
adopt the more general right-to-manage framework (of which the
monopoly union model is, of course, a special case) in which the
union and the firm bargain over wages, before the firm then sets 
employment to maximise profits. Within this approach, we view
the level of union membership in the establ ishment as an 
important determinant of the union's bargaining power relative to 
that of the firm in the wage bargain. In particular, we assume that 
as union density grows then the firm is able to employ fewer 
workers in the event of a disagreement between the union and
the firm. Thus, the firm's disagreement payoff is falling in union 
density. We show that this can generate a bargained wage which 
is increasing in union density. This is in marked contrast to the 
median-voter model in which the wage is decreasing in union
membership. Consequently, our results frequently diverge from 
those derived within a monopoly-union median-voter framework. 
The formal model in this section draws on Naylor and Raaum 
(1993).
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We suppose that the firm pays all workers the same wage, 
W, which is the higher of the bargained wage, WB, and the outside 
option of each worker, WC - the competitive wage. The bargained 
wage is determined as the outcome of a Nash bargain between the 
union and the firm. Hence,
WB = argmax [(W - s) - (n - rt)] (4.6)
W
where s and 7i are the disagreement payoffs to the union and the 
firm respectively, s is the strike pay received by each worker and 
is assumed to be exogenous. The firm's profit is given by n  = R[L| - 
WL and n is the firm's profit during a strike and is given by.
7t = F[(l - p)L°] - (1 - p)W°L° (4.7)
where F denotes the firm's revenue function, p is union density, 
and W° and L° are the predetermined levels of wages and 
employment, respectively, during a strike. Thus, we are assuming
that in the event of a strike the firm is able to employ only that
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fraction of its workers who are not union members.
Implicit in equation (4.6) is the assumption that the union 
objective is to maximise the wage [for a discussion, see Oswald 
(1985)]. Flat indifference curves for the union are likely to occur if 
the representative union member is protected against redundancy 
by a seniority rule, for example. Following Moene (1988), the 
outcome of the wage bargain described in (4.6) can be written as:
(4.8)
2l  L L
In steady state, when W = W° and L = L°. this becomes:
WB = l J —  + d  - |i )WB + s (4.9)
2l L L
and hence.
1 [F(L) f[(i - p )l ] | : (4 .10)
1 + p L L
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Thus, for given L, we can show that the steady-state bargained 
wage is increasing in union density:
as F'(L) = WB , under right-to-manage assumptions, and F"(L) < 0. 
Thus, for a given employment level, higher union density raises 
the wage and this will then induce a move along the firm's labour 
demand curve. We make the usual assumption of a myopic firm 
which neglects the impact of today's employment  on future 
negotiations [for a discussion of this, see Moene, Hoel and 
Wallerstein (1992)]. Hence, we can conclude that the bargained 
wage is increasing in union density. From (4.10) it is clear that the 
bargained wage tends to s as union density tends to zero, and 
consequently the wage-density schedule has the form depicted in 
Figure 4.4, below.
(4.11)
W f
s
0 i n
Fig u re  4.4 The wage schedule.
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As s, the inside option, is likely to be less than WC, the 
outside option, we conclude that there is some minimum union 
density level, p min in Figure 4.4, which the union must achieve if 
it is to be able to raise wages above the competitive level. In the 
next section, we consider the interaction of the wage and density 
schedules .
4 . 5 .  W a g e s  and  union m e m b e r s h i p
In this Section we bring together the analyses of the previous two 
Sections. Figure 4.5 illustrates the wage and density schedules of 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
F igu re  4,5 Intermediate equilibrium with a 
positive mark-up.
9 0
With the wage and density schedules as depicted in Figure
4.5, there is just one stable equilibrium at p = p* and W = W*. 
where 0 < p < 1 and W* > WC. p = 0 is not an equilibrium as the 
wage conditional on this level of membership, WC, is sufficient to 
induce union membership toward p*. Beyond p*, union density 
does not generate a sufficiently high wage level to sustain 
membership in excess of p*. Thus, membership at p * is the 
equilibrium in this case and generates a wage of W*. The special 
features of the case are that WC lies above wcrp and that the 
density schedule cuts the wage schedule from below and to the 
right of p m in- For WC > W cri t , there are two other possible 
outcomes. The first occurs when the wage schedule lies 
everywhere above the density schedule and hence p*=l.  This is a 
possible explanation of the closed shop with 100% membership. 
The second possible outcome occurs when the density schedule 
cuts the wage schedule to the left of p min . in which case p* is still 
an intermediate density equilibrium, but one in which the union is 
unable to raise wages above the competitive level.
For WC < Wcrjt, there are a further two possible outcomes. 
First, there is the case in which the density schedule lies 
everywhere above the wage schedule, implying there is no 
positive level of membership capable of generating a wage level 
sufficient to sustain that membership level. Flence, the only stable 
equilibrium is p = 0. Second, if the wage schedule cuts the density
schedule from below, then the point of intersection will represent 
an unstable intermediate equilibrium above which density will 
rise to p = 1 and below which membership will fall to zero. Thus, 
for WC < W c r j[, there are no stable intermediate equilibria and 
hence the existence of the open shop trade union is compatible 
only with certain of those cases in which WC > W crit , that is in 
which the wage necessary to induce a solidarity equilibrium is 
less than the compet i t ive  wage.  Addit ional ly ,  for  the 
establishment to be characterised by intermediate rather than full 
membership of  the union, the wage and density schedules must 
have an intersection at p < 1. As can be seen from Figure 4.5, this 
will be more likely the greater is p mjn and the flatter is the wage 
schedule, i.e. the lower is the wage for any given level of union 
membership. As a corollary of this, we can conclude that a high 
and steep wage schedule, ceteris paribus, is likey to lead to 100% 
m embersh ip .
We now offer a summary of the comparative static and 
other properties of the model, focussing initially on the case 
depicted in Figure 4.5.
P r o p e r t y  2 a  A change in d, the net cost o f  
m e m b e r s h i p .
We know from property la in Section 4.3 that an increase in 
the net cost of  membership, d, will cause an upward shift in the 
p(W) schedule. Therefore, as we can see from Figure 4.5, there will
be a reduction in g*  and W*. There will be a non-zero or 
intermediate equilibrium level of union density so long as Wcr jt 
stays above WC.
It should be noticed that this property is very different 
from that implied by the median-voter class of models. In those 
models any upward shift in a posit ively-s loped membership 
schedule will represent  an upward movement  a long the 
negatively-sloped wage schedule, thus producing a higher wage. 
Hence, an exogenous change, such as an increase in subscription 
costs, causes a reduction in membership, but an increase in wages. 
This seems counter-intuitive and contrary to the result we obtain 
from our model.
P r o p e r t y  2b A change in 9.
We saw in property lc in Section 4.3 that an increase in 0. 
the group's propensity to value solidarity effects [that is, in terms 
of Figure 4.2, a shift to the right of the e-dist ribut ion schedu le | .  
would raise the solidarity-equilibrium level of membership Ipoint 
n in Figure 4.2| and reduce the threshold level of union density. 
Hence, an increase in 0 shifts the g(W) schedule downward and, 
consequently, produces an increase in both the wage and the 
equilibrium level of union membership. If density reaches 100%, 
further increases in 0 fail to raise wages further.
P r o p e r t y  2c A change in a .
From property Id we have that an increase in a ,  which 
represents individual sensitivity to solidarity effects,will cause a 
downward shift in the p(W) schedule, implying the same effects as 
an increase in 8, as described in property 2b above. Again, the 
implication for the wage is the opposite of that implied by the 
median-voter model.
P r o p e r t y  2d A change in strike pay, s.
An increase in strike pay, s - the unions disagreement 
payoff - will raise the bargained wage for each level of union 
density, and hence cause an upward shift in the wage schedule, 
W  = m a x | W B ,  W C | ,  in Figure 4 . 5 .  This will generate increases in both 
the wage outcome and the equilibrium level of union density. If p* 
reaches 100%, further reductions in s will continue to raise the 
wage. Similarly, any industrial relations legislation which reduces 
the union's disagreement payoff  or raises that of the firm - for 
example by outlawing picketing or secondary industrial action - 
will lower the wage schedule and thereby reduce both the 
bargained wage and the level of union density. The bargained 
wage falls directly because of the reduction in the union's relative 
bargaining power, and indirect ly because of the consequent 
reduction in union density. Traditional models, focussing only on
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the former argument, ignore the interactions between density and 
the bargained wage.
In the case depicted in Figure 4.5 the intersection of the 
wage and membership schedules yields a stable intermediate 
union density equil ibrium, thereby providing an explanation of 
the open shop trade union with intermediate density. Properties 
2a to 2d demonstrate how the density level in the open shop will 
either fall or rise as various parameters in the model vary and 
that both direct and indirect mechanisms operate. We have 
assumed so far that WC > Wcrg We now consider what happens if 
the changes in a, 8 or d are sufficient to push W crj| above WC.
P r o p e r t y  2e WC < W cr/f
If WC < Wcrji then, as we have seen, any intersection, g*. of 
the wage and membership schedules will represent an unstable 
intermediate wage-density equilibrium and there will be stable 
equilibria at g = 0 and g = 1. In such a case, a fall in the 
membership schedule, g(W), - brought about by, for example, a 
reduction in d or by an increase in either a or 0 - will reduce g * ,  
thereby making the g = 1 outcome more likely. Conversely, an 
upward shift in g (W)  will increase g* in the limit producing a 
unique equilibrium at g=0. When the unstable equilibrium g* is 
high, the g = l stable equilibrium is more vulnerable to any
exogenous temporary reduction in the wage or membership 
schedule. For example, if there is high labour turnover in the
establishment then there is a greater risk that at any one time p
might fall below p* and hence that membership will unravel to 
the stable equilibrium at p = 0. In such cases, unions recruitment 
activity will have to be more intensive and this might explain the 
need for the union to establish a closed shop. Similarly, a 
reduction in s, strike pay, causes a downward shift in the wage 
schedule, increasing p* and making p = 0 more likely. Thus, the
union's disagreement  payoff again affects the level of union
membership, a property not present in other microeconomic 
models of the trade union.
In the next Section, we offer a summary of the results of the 
model and some further remarks.
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4 . 6  C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed a model which is capable of explaining a 
number of apparently puzzling features about union membership. 
First, we have overcome the 'free-rider' problem in providing an 
explanation of voluntary membership of  the open shop trade 
union. Second, the model is capable of explaining intermediate 
equilibrium levels of membership. Third, the model is consistent 
with the empirical findings that workplace and regional effects 
are important  but that observed personal characterist ics are 
insignificant determinants of union membership.
9 6
More importantly, we have shown how the wage outcome is 
likely to be influenced by the level of union density in the 
establ ishment  and therefore by the parameters of the social 
custom model  of union membership.  In particular, we have 
argued that both union density and the wage level are likely to 
increase as a result of: a reduction in union membership costs, an 
increase in strike pay or an increase in individuals' sensitivity to 
the social custom of union membership and the associated 
solidarity effects. We have argued that these properties of the 
model are very different from those deriving from the monopoly­
union median-voter framework in which the wage is falling in 
union membership and hence in which an increase in membership 
leads to a fall in the wage. These differing predictions suggest the 
possibility of testing the competing theories empirically. We have 
also suggested that where the union does not have a closed shop, 
the monopoly-union assumption that the union chooses the wage 
is less plausible than the bargaining framework we develop in 
Section 4.4.
Furthermore, we have argued that the model captures some 
effects not characterised in other models. For example, the 
increase in strike pay raises the bargained wage for any given 
level of union membership, but this is then likely to cause an 
increase in union density which will further raise wages. In
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equilibrium, wages are higher because of this interaction between 
these direct and indirect effects of strike pay on wages. Because 
the wage and membership schedules are both upward-sloping, the 
indirect effect on the wage reinforces rather than offsets the 
direct effect. Finally, we have examined the case in which p = 0 is 
the lower of two potential stable equilibria. We have argued that 
such a case might be a motivating factor for the union to establish 
a closed shop arrangement with the firm so as to guarantee the 
100% membership equilibrium. Our main concern, however, has 
been with the stable intermediate equilibrium associated with the 
voluntary-membership open shop.
A p p e n d i x  4.1
In Section 4.3 we argued that an increase in 6 ,  the group's 
propensity to value solidarity effects - that is a general shift to 
the right of the e-dist ribut ion - would raise the solidarity- 
equilibrium level of membership [ poi n t n in Figure 4.2] and 
reduce the threshold level of union density. To prove this one 
needs to implicitly differentiate the equations:
1 - f(e*, 8) = p(e*, a ,  d, W), p* = p(e*, a , d, W)
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with respect to 0. This gives:
3e* -fe _ -f,fn
ae ’ ae fe + ^
3e de
Note: 3|i*/30 = -fe3e*/30
The denominator is negative at the equilibrium point whilst it is 
positive at the threshold level of membership. For example at the 
equilibrium level the slope of decision schedule 3p /3e is more 
negative than the slope of the distribution schedule -fe, or 3p/3e < - 
fe so 3p/0e + fe < 0. The converse is true at the threshold level. 
Multiplying the denominator by the partial derivatives -fe > 0 and 
fef© S 0 gives the comparative statics effects claimed above: the 
derivative 3p*/00 is positive at the equilibrium level and negative 
at the threshold level.
C h a p t e r  5 Union Densi ty ,  Wage D e te rm ina t ion  and 
M a n a g e m e n t  O p p o s i t i o n .
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5 .1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical model in 
which the level of union membership and the union wage mark­
up are determined endogenously and in which there is a role for a 
non-passive firm to oppose union organisation. Thus the model 
which we shall develop shares many of the features of that 
presented in the previous chapter,  but adds the potentially 
important dimension of the impact of the firm on union 
membership. As in the previous chapters, our work here contrasts 
with most of  the recent economic theory of the trade union which 
has assumed a union closed shop with a fixed membership level. 
The empirical evidence on the pattern of union density across 
es tabl ishments  indicates  the importance of explaining the 
existence of the open shop. Millward and Stevens (1986) report 
that half the private sector establishments in the WIRS1 data set 
are characterised by a positive level of union density of less than 
100% whilst a closed shop is present in fewer than half of the 
e s tab l i shm en ts  in which union m em bers  are present .  
Furthermore, it is likely that the ability of the union to obtain a
'The Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (1984) for the UK
wage mark-up will depend, amongst other things, upon the level 
of union membership. This underlines the need to explain the 
determinants of density in analysing union wage effects.
As we argued in the previous chapter, a shortcoming of the 
early social custom models of union membership was that they 
tended to concen tra te  exclusively on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the workers and of the workplace with no role 
ascribed to market influences such as the supply and demand for 
labour, or the behaviour of the firm. [Booth and Chatterji (1991) is 
a recent exception]. This is a deficiency in the light of strong 
empirical evidence that employer behaviour , in the form of 
management opposition, is a key determinant  of unionisation. 
Drawing on Freeman and Medoff (1984), Dickens and Leonard 
(1985), Freeman (1986) and Farber (1987): Freeman and Kleiner
(1988) argue that, "Many have come to believe that the growth of 
opposition has been a major, if not the major, direct cause of the 
decline in private sector unionism in the U.S.." Management 
opposition to unions in the U.S. is most obvious during NLRB 
elections when either unions are at tempting to unionise an 
establishment or the employer is seeking de-unionisation.
In the U.K., representation elections of the US kind do not 
occur, but firms still have the option of spending resources to 
deter or diminish union organisation. For example, firms can 
oppose unions by hiring legal advisers, instituting non-union 
collective voice mechanisms, laying off activists or by their choice
of technology or production process. Lazear (1983) hypothesises 
the firm making contributions to employee funds to appease non- 
unionised labour. He also includes the possible Harvard-type 
foregone product ivi ty  gains of  opposing unions. Furthermore, 
there is evidence of  growing management  opposition to trade 
unions in the UK via the recent growth in union de-recognition2 
cases [see Claydon (1989)| .  Gregg and Yates (1991) find from a 
retrospective survey of 558 UK companies  that complete  
derecognition has been rare, but that partial derecognition has 
been more c o m m o n 3. Freeman and Pelletier (1990) argue that 
managements in the UK can affect the ability of unions to enroll 
members. They cite evidence of the observed lower union density 
in plants that do not recognise unions than in plants where a 
union is recognised. They conclude that a major reason for the 
dramatic fall in union density in the UK in the 1980s was the 
change in the legislat ive environment  which, "st rengthened 
management's hand in opposing unions." Finally, we can think of 
the firm's location decision as influenced by spatial differences in 
the probability of unionisation. At a cost, the firm can re-locate an 
establishment following its unionisation. We discuss this further 
later in the paper. Each method of management opposition is 
likely to be costly. The firm must balance this cost against any 
reduction in profits which it expects to follow from unionisation or 
an increase in union density.
•Recognition refers to the situation in which an employer recognises a union 
for the purposes of bargaining over wages and other conditions of work.
3They report that 13% of companies with recognition in 1984 had experienced 
derecognition by 1990.
In this chapter, then, we allow union membership to be 
influenced by both social custom effects and by resources devoted 
by management to opposing unionisation. In our model, the wage 
is determined as the higher of the competitive wage and the wage 
predicted by a right-to-manage Nash bargaining model [see, for 
example, Nickell and Andrews (1983)]. This part of the model 
extends the analysis in the previous chapter by generalising the 
Nas bargain to cover the general asymmetric case. We still find 
that the wage is increasing in union membership when density 
exceeds a certain threshold level, since higher density means 
more workers will take part in industrial action, thereby lowering 
the firm's profit during a conflict. The novelty of the current 
chapter is that this is now seen to provide the firm with an 
incentive to spend resources to reduce union density. Within this 
set-up we are thus able to investigate the effects on wages and 
density of changes in the competitive wage, market power, the 
effectiveness of management opposition and workers' attachment 
to trade unions. This extends the standard model of union-firm 
bargaining which derives comparative static effects assuming a 
fixed union density.
We find that social custom effects generate a base level of 
union membership in the establishment and that there is a critical 
level which this base level of union membership must at least 
equal if union density in the establishment is to be at a level 
sufficiently high to deter management from opposing unions. If
the base level satisfies this condition then actual density will be 
equal to the base level and the firm will not allocate resources to 
oppose union membership. Consequently,  the union obtains  a 
positive wage mark-up. We can think of this as the case where the 
firm 'recognises' the union. If, however, the base level is less than 
the critical level then the firm will spend just sufficient resources 
to reduce membership to that level [which may be non-zero] at 
which the wage outcome from bargaining would be equal to the 
compet i t ive  outcome.  The ex is tence of a union in the 
establishment depends, therefore, upon the relative magnitude of 
the base level of membership and the critical level, and therefore 
upon both social custom effects and the behaviour of the firm.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 5.2 
considers how wages are determined conditional on some level of 
union membership which is taken as given when the firm and the 
union bargain over wages, as characterised by the generalised 
asymmetric Nash bargain. We find that the bargained wage is 
increasing in union membership. In Section 5.3 we present a 
simplified social custom model of union membership in which 
some base level of union density is determined. The social custom 
model in this chapter is simplified to avoid repition with previous 
discussion. In Section 5.4 of the paper we allow for the possibility 
that the firm can spend resources to reduce union density and we 
examine the determinants of union membership,  wages and 
employment in such circumstances. Hence, the first stage in the 
sequence of events which we describe consists of workers'
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individual membership decisions. The second stage is the firm's 
decision over the allocat ion of resources to oppose union 
membership and the third stage is the wage bargain. In the 
ensuing analysis, we follow the practice of examining the third 
stage first, as the f i rm’s optimising choice with respect to 
management opposition will be taken conditional on a calculation 
of the impact of union membership on the wage outcome. Section 
5.5 then contains a discussion of the comparative static properties 
of the model and in Section 5.6 we offer some concluding remarks.
1 04
5 . 2  Wage  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and  un ion  m e m b e r s h i p
The firm pays all workers the same wage, W, given by:
W = max( Wc , WB|
where Wc is the competitive wage which is taken to be each 
worker's outside option and WB denotes the outcome of wage 
bargaining at the firm level. The outcome of wage bargaining can 
be described formally by the Nash bargaining solution:
W B = argmax {(W - s ^ n  - (5.1)
w
where
s = strike pay 2 0 
n  = F(L) - WL. F(L) > 0. F'(L) < 0
L = number of workers
k = profit during a strike = F((l -p)L°)  - ( l - p ) W (,L°
p = union density
P = union bargaining power
W« = the wage paid to non-striking workers
L° = total labour force when a strike takes place.
The union objective is to maximize the wage. This utility function 
reflects the interests of the representative union member if she is 
protected against redundancy by a seniority rule or insulated 
from layoffs by a sufficiently high turnover [see Oswald (1985)]. 
The outcome of the wage bargain can then be written as:
WB=  p E i k l  +  ( , _ p )s _ p i
L L (5.2)
Equation (5.2) shows that the wage depends on employment (in 
the contract period) as well as the labour force during a strike 
(through ti).
Consider first the outcome for a given employment level, where 
W° and L° are predetermined. The wage is increasing in p as long 
as the marg inal  revenue during a s t r ike exceeds the 
predetermined wage;
^ = p1 4 f ((i - n)L°] - W°] 
op. L
When unionisation increases, the firm's net loss during a strike is 
the marginal revenue of strike employment  minus the reduction 
in labour costs (equal to the going wage, W°).
We consider  the t radi tional  r ight - to -manage model where 
employment is adjusted unilaterally by the firm such that:
F'(L) = W
Following Moene, Hoel and Wallerstein (1992), it can be shown 
that this description corresponds to the usual assumption of a 
myopic firm which neglects the impact of today's employment on 
future wage negotiations [see Raaum and Naylor (1992)). The 
steady state solution, where L°=L and WB = W°, is then determined 
by the two equations:
1 06
WB = i___|i, -pk+pieti. Sü_iüü1 - p(l - p)l = G(L,p) (5.3)
W B= F'(L)
Figure 5.1 illustrates the outcome, where G(L,p) denotes the right 
hand side of equation (5.3).
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Figure  5.1. Union Density and Wage-Employment Outcomes.
The wage function, G(L,p) in (5.3), shifts if unionisation in the firm 
increases;
^  = ------ j------- - M ( \  - p)L] - WB] > 0
1 - P(1 - p)
since F' (L)  = WB and F"(L)  < 0. Thus, a higher union density
raises the wage for a given employment level. Higher labour costs 
reduce employment which induces a further increase in the wage, 
as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
It follows directly from (5.3) that
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l im  W B = s
H-^0
The relevant strike pay, s, is the income per member
received by the local union from outside sources and we assume 
that this income is lower than the competitive wage. Hence, there 
will be a positive level of unionisation, called p + , such that WB = W C 
at p+ and WB> W C if p>p + . We assume throughout the paper that the 
firm earns a positive rent even at p = l ,  implying p +< l .
The wage-membership function, then, can be illustrated as
in Figure 5.2. The wage is an increasing function of union density,
p, provided that p exceeds a positive level p + . The union density
level determines the fraction of the workforce which would take 
part in a potential industrial action (strike). The firm's profit 
during a strike is reduced if the number of non-striking workers 
decreases as a consequence of higher unionisation. As the firm's 
conflict payoff declines, the union obtains a higher wage. However, 
the outcome of the bargain will not exceed the workers' outside 
option, WC. unless union density is above a certain level, p + .
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Figure  5.2 The Bargained Wage as a Function of  Union 
Density
We have now established a positive relationship between 
union density and the wage4, based on the idea that higher 
unionisation raises the power of the union through more effective 
strikes. However, the credible industrial action might  in many 
cases be go-slow or work-to-rule practices by the workers, see e.g. 
Moene (1988). It can be shown that even these regimes give a 
wage which depends positively on the union density (equal to the 
fraction of the labour force taking part in an industrial action). We 
now turn to the analysis of the determinants of union density.
4Empirical support for this result can be found in Reilly (1991) who reports 
from US data that, "The results suggest that the union is able to increase wages 
over the nonunion establishment only after it has organised 25% of the 
individuals in the establishment. Al l  individuals in an establishment with a 
union density between 26% and 50% achieve a wage gain...of 13%. The wage 
gain for the 51% to 75% union density category is 21%...Individuals working 
for an establishment with a greater than 75%...density achieve a wage gain of 
54%.''
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5 . 3  Union densi ty  in a social custom model
In the open shop context which we are addressing, a worker joins 
the union - voluntarily - if she finds it in her own interest to do 
so. In the spirit of  Akerlof's (1980) social custom model - 
elaborated in a union membership context by Booth (1985) and 
Naylor (1990) - workers derive utility from the reputation effects 
of belonging to the union. Members conform with the social
custom invoking workers not to free-ride on the collective action
of their colleagues.
The worker's utility (Ui) is, following the approach by Naylor
(1989),
Ui = W - dQ + ejQ/(t - Vp)
where Q=1 for a union member and Q=0 if the worker does not
join the union. W is the wage, d represents the net costs5 to the
worker of membership,  ej is the individual i's sensitivity to 
reputation effects of membership and l /( t-Vp) is the "reputation
5The model is consistent with the existence of private incentive benefits for 
members so long as these arc less than the individual membership fee.
function" (assuming t-Vp>0). Our specif ica t ion implies that the 
difference in utility between joining and non-membership is 
increasing in union density (given £j). In other words, it is 
assumed that the cost of free-riding rises when union density 
increases. The specification is chosen to yield just one stable 
equilibrium solution. This is evident in Figure 5.3 which shows the 
decision schedule to be linear.
The workers are heterogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to 
reputation effects, e is distributed uniformly between e° and e 1.
The individual joins the union if:
W - d + £j/(t - Vp) > W
i.e. ej > d(t - Vp)
An equilibrium density (p°)  is defined such that no individuals 
want to change their membership status, given p = p ° .  Full 
membership represents an equilibrium if sensitivity to reputation 
effects are sufficiently strong relative to the membership fee, i.e.,
| i°=l if £0 > d(t - V) (5.4)
and no workers join the union if reputation effects are sufficiently 
weak, i.e..
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p° = 0 if e 1 < dt (5.5)
Equi librium unionisat ion may also involve less than full 
membership. Let D(x) be the fraction of workers with ei > x. Since 
e is uniformly distributed:
Define e* as the critical level of e where all workers with e > e* join 
the union. Thus,
e* = d(t - V(i)
An equilibrium p° between zero and unity is then defined by:
= p = D(x) and x = e*
Thus, the equilibrium unionisation is equal to:
D(x) = £-r^ - , if  e° < x <e *.Pl_p0
^0 = ___e1 - dt___
(e1 - e°) - dV (5.6)
This equilibrium is shown in Figure 5.3
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Figure  5.3 Equilibrium density when e°<d(t-V) and e ’>dt.
From Figure 5.3 it is clear that a reduction in eO and e> (i.e. in the 
sensitivity to reputation effects for all workers) will lower p°  and 
imply that the equilibrium with no membership [full membership! 
is more lless] likely. Similarly, a higher net membership tee will 
reduce equilibrium density.
The next section considers the firm's ability and incentive to 
influence unionsation of its work force.
5 . 4  M a n a g e m e n t  op p o s i t i o n ,  wages and union dens i ty
We argued in Section 5.1 of this chapter that there is empirical 
support for the hypothesis that firms will be prepared to spend 
resources to deter or diminish trade union membership in the
establishment. In this Section of the chapter we investigate this 
further, hypothesising that the firm's expenditure weakens the 
social custom effects which drive membership. In a US context, 
this might be picking up the effect of management efforts to 
reduce the NLRB election vote for the union. An alternative 
interpretation would be to think of the firm spending resources to 
improve the working environment  and hence diminishing the 
demand for union representation.
In Section 5.1 we suggested a number of ways in which 
firms might spend resources  to oppose unionisation. A further 
illustration of such expenditure is the investment by the firm in a 
screening device at the point of recruitment aimed at providing 
the firm with in fo rm a t ion  about  ind iv idual  appl ican ts '  
propensities to join trade unions. Applicants might be screened on 
the basis of noisy signals such as previous workplace, industry or 
occupation, or such personal characterisi tics as age, gender, 
experience, education or previous union activity. In this way the 
firm can reduce the likelihood of employing those workers who 
are more likely to join a union. Essentially, this means that the 
management's allocation o f  resources to oppose unionisation shifts 
the e-distribution to the left.
It could be argued that we should allow for the symmetric 
possibility of expenditures by the union to enhance membership. 
It would be straightforward to allow for exogenous lump-sum 
expenditures on recruitment  by a union at, for example, the
industry or occupational level. Indeed, we could interpret the 
very exis tence of the social custom as being due to some 
exogenous expenditure by a trade union. We would defend our 
decision not to allow for simultaneity between union expenditures 
and union density by the observation that union recruitment 
campaigns are generally organised out of unions' central budgets 
rather than at the establishment level. Similarly, net costs of 
membership are determined centrally. In support, we cite Kelly 
and Heery (1989) who conclude that, "...research suggests that 
local union officials have devoted relatively little time to 
recruitment and have been mainly occupied with negotiation, 
administration and general servicing." Nevertheless, one might 
wish to model a 'recruitment game' in which the firm and the local 
union make strategic decisions about  allocating resources to 
influence the level of membership. We leave such considerations 
for further work.
We have shown in Section 5.2 that unless unionisation in the 
establishment exceeds a certain level (p + ), the workers obtain the 
competitive wage (Wc ). Thus, the firm is passive and spends no 
resources to fight unionisation if p°£p + . Throughout this section we 
consider the case where p°>p + , i.e the firm faces workers who will 
unionise and obtain a wage higher than the competitive level if 
the management takes no action.
The management can attempt to reduce unionisation among 
its labour force by spending resources, R. We model this in a 
simple way, assuming that R influences the distribution of 
individual sensitivity to reputation effects of membership:
e '= e 1 - rR, e ° =  e° - rR (5.7)
where e1, e° , and r are constants, and r denotes the effectiveness 
of management  opposition. Replacing (7) in (6) yields the 
equilibrium density with management opposition ( p m)
pm = 1, if e° - rR > d(t-V) (5.8)
pm = g1- rR-.dl if E° - rR < d(t-V) (5.9)
Hence, p m is a linear function of p° and R:
pm = p ° - 7------- \ --------R=p°-<DR (5.10)
(e1- E° ) - dV
where 0 * , ------- -^------- is constant.
(e 1 - e°) - dV
The (net long-run) profit of the firm is given by:
1 1 6
n  = F(L) - W L - R (5.11)
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where W = W(pn>), FL = W (5 .12)
and n m = |i° - 0R (5 .13)
We now allow the management to choose R to maximize 
profits, taking into account the effects on unionisation and the 
wage bargaining outcome. This sequence of decision-making is
chosen to emphasise how firms can affect unionisation. It seems 
natural to consider unionisation as given when wages are 
negotiated since campaigns by the firm to affect  union
membership are unlikely to cause immediate changes in workers' 
attitudes towards unions. Changing the importance ot social
customs and reputation effects is likely to be a long-term process 
for the firm.
Inserting (5.12) and (5.13) in (5.11), and differentiating the profit 
function with respect to R yields:
—  = n R = Wh<|>L - 1
1 1 8
The profit function is convex in R if the expression in brackets in 
equation (5.14) is positive. The first term is positive, as a 
reduction in the wage at a "low" level of p has a stronger impact 
on profits due to a large labour force. The sign of the second term, 
however, is ambiguous and related to the convexity of the wage 
function. We assume that riRR>0, which certainly is the case unless 
both W is concave in p and (W^) dominates the first positive term.
The optimal choice of R, with n  convex in R, is then a discrete 
choice between:
(i) R=0 (no opposition) with profit given by:
n  = n« = F(L) - W(p°)L where FL = W(pO),
and
(ii) R = R C (sufficient opposition to realize the competitive wage) 
with profit.
n  = n c  = F(LC) - w cl c - rc
where Rc represents the resources necessary to realize p = p + .
We have, then.
and since unionisation below p + does not affect the wage, the firm 
will obviously not spend more than Rc . Thus, the firm chooses:
The base level of unionisation, i.e. the union density without 
management oppsosition (p°), will influence n °  as well as n c . First, 
the profit with a passive firm, n ° ,  is decreasing in p° since higher 
union density improves the bargaining strength of the union and 
raises the wage:
R = 0 if n °  > n c
R = Rc if n° < nc
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a r r
ap°
= - w hl
a2n °
a(n°)2
> o
when n RR > 0
Ì
>
J
(5.15)
Second, the base level, p°, affects how expensive it will be for the 
firm to avoid unionisation above | i+ ;
dRc  _ 1 _  _ a n c 1â p °  (J) 5 |i°  (J) (5 .16)
We then have two possible cases illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4:
Case I. Ineffect ive  Case 2. Potentially
Management Opposition Effective Management
Opposition
Case 1 can be labelled the case of ' ineffective management  
opposition' and corresponds to a situation where6:
(5.17)
i.e. the necessary marginal costs to hold p at p + , when p° rises, 
exceed the increase in labour cost caused by higher union density.
Case 2, on the other hand, is a situation in which it pays the firm 
to fight unionisation when p° is low:
There is, however, a critical level of p°, say p*, where the firm is 
indifferent between opposing and not opposing unionisation 
(which means that n °  = I~lc ). Thus,
R = 0 if p° > p* and R = Rc if p° < p*.
Note that these results also hold if the base level of unionisation is 
higher than unity, i.e. a situation in which the firm must spend a 
certain amount of  resources before it obtains lower unionisation. 
Similarly, of course, p* > 1 is a possibility.
6lf (17) holds for \ ° = \  + , it follows from (15) and (16) that fl° exceeds for all
for p° = p+ (5.18)
X°>\+.
Our main argument, then, can be summarized as follows. The 
union obtains a positive mark-up on the competitive wage with a 
membership p° if both:
(i) W(pO) > w c,
and either,
(ii) W ^L  < 1/0 , for p° = p+ (management opposition is
ineffective - Case 1)
or
(iii) |i°>p* (the base level is sufficiently high to induce
passivity by the firm - under Case 2).
Conversely, the firm spends resources to fight unionisation, such 
that p° = |i+ , if three conditions hold simultaneously:
(i) W(pO)>\VC.
(ii) W ^L > 1/0 , for p° = | i+ (management opposition is effective)
( i i i )  p 0 <  p * ( t h e  b a s e  l e v e l  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l o w ) .
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The next section considers the comparative static properties of the 
model.
5 . 5  C o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s
The wage and the union membership predicted by our model are 
affected in various ways as parameters describing the wage 
formation and the unionisation process change.
(i) Reputa t ion ef fects  and  the cost o f  m em bersh ip
The implications of parameters which describe unionisation are 
reasonably straightforward. The base level, pO, will differ across 
establishments as either reputation and social custom effects or 
costs of membership vary (see Section 5.3). A reduction in pO 
reduces the bargaining strength of the union, possibly to a level 
where the wage equals the competitive level. A lower base level 
of union membership may also induce the firm to spend resources 
to push union membership down to the base level. This will occur 
provided that opposition is "effective" and that pO has become
lower than p*. The negative wage effect of a lower pO wj|i be 
strengthened by this change in management policy.
(ii) E f fe c t i v e ness  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  oppos i t ion .
The effectiveness of management opposition, measured by 0. has 
intuitively reasonable implications for unionisation and wages. A 
higher  0 makes it more likely that spending resources is 
"effective". Moreover, an increase in 0 reduces the steepness of I~IC 
and a lower p * follows, as would be evident in Figure 5.4. It is 
therefore more likely that a firm finds it advantageous to spend 
the resources to fight unionisation and therefore realize p = p + .
(iii) M a r k e t  pow er
Like most wage bargaining models, our set-up predicts that the 
workers obtain a share of the rents created by a higher product 
market power - see the appendix for details of the case in which 
market power is interpreted as the inverse of the product demand 
elasticity. The implications for wages and unionsation are as 
follows. The workers obtain a posit ive mark-up on the 
competitive wage at a lower level of unionisation when market 
power is high, i.e. p + is low in firms with strong market power. 
However, this mark-up is obtained by the workers only if the 
base level, p0,  exceeds p*, given that management opposition is
otherwise effective. The size of market power has an ambiguous 
effect on p* .  Since more market power reduces p + , it becomes 
more expensive for the firm to keep unionisation at the level 
which yields Wc as the outcome of the wage bargaining. Thus, the 
necessary Rc increases and i~Ic falls for any level of pO. This effect 
contributes to a lower p*. On the other hand, the firm keeps all the 
rent from more market power if unionisation beyond p + is 
avoided, but has to share the higher profits if it does not spend 
resources to fight union membership. This provides the firm with 
stronger incentives to fight unionisation and therefore contributes 
to a higher p*. Thus the overall effect on p* is ambiguous.
Our model  predicts,  then, that the standard positive 
relationship between the firm's product market power and the 
wage is not necessari ly true when management opposition 
towards unionisation is taken into account. A firm with strong 
market power may find it advantageous to fight unionisation 
simply because the rents with low union membership are greater.
(iv) The compe t i t ive  wage
The competit ive wage represents the outside options to the 
workers and is therefore the lower bound on the wage. If Wc 
increases, a higher union density is required to obtain a bargained 
wage above the competitive level. Moreover, the profit in the 
event of no management opposition ( f l c ) is reduced for all base
levels of unionisation. The profit (I~I°) of a passive firm, however, 
is unaffected as long as the competitive wage does not affect WB. 
As n c  shifts and n °  is unaffected, the critical level of unionisation, 
p*, is reduced when the competitive wage increases An illustration 
is given in Figure 5.5.
F igu re  5.5. An Increase in the Competitive Wage.
A lower p* means that unionisation becomes more likely as a 
consequence of a higher competitive wage. Since the benefits from 
management  opposition are lowered, the firm will accept the 
union at a lower base level of union density.
In the various microeconomic theories of wage formation, 
the competitive wage often affects the outcome through the union 
objectives or via the disaggreement payoffs. Our conclusion still 
holds under such circumstances so long as an increase in the
competitive wage does not raise the wage ratio (WB/WC). Even if 
W B increases as a consequence of a higher competitive wage, the 
shift in n c will be larger than that of n° and, consequently, p* will 
decrease.
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5 . 6  C o n c l u d i n g  R e m a rk s .
The open shop trade union is an empirically important context for 
bargaining between a firm and a union and is likely to become 
increasingly relevant in the UK following further legislation to 
weaken the closed shop. Yet most  theoretical models are 
concerned exclusively with the case of the closed shop with fixed 
union membership. It has been argued that empirical evidence 
also supports the view that management  opposition can be a 
major influence on union membership. In this paper we offer a 
microeconomic model of union-firm bargaining in which union 
density is made endogenous through the possibility that the 
profit-maximising firm will allocate resources to weaken support 
for union representation. We show that the firm e i th e r  spends 
just sufficient resources to reduce union membership to that level 
at which the outcome of the wage bargaining equals the 
competitive wage or  accepts unionisation without allocating any 
resources in opposition. The comparative static properties of the 
model are then able to address a richer set of parameters than is 
true of more orthodox models. Thus,  for example, our model
predicts that the standard positive relationship between the firm's 
product market power and the wage does not necessarily hold 
when management  opposit ion is taken into account. This 
prediction is consistent with econometric evidence which finds 
that  both product  market  condi t ions and the bargaining 
arrangements  at the establ ishment  combine to determine the 
capacity of the union to raise wages above non-union levels [see 
Stewart (1987) and (1990)].
APPENDIX 5.1
1 29
On the influence o f  market power
Let each firm face a product demand given by:
Y = y ( E [ E, E > 1
(A5.1)  ' P '
where P = 1 denotes the overall price level, for simplicity. The 
firm has a constant labour productivity set to unity:
( A5.2)  L =Y
The revenue function. F, is then given by:
( A5.3) f  =  y i/e l m / 6
By inserting (A5.3) in the wage bargaining equations (5.3) and 
(5.4), we obtain a reduced form solution for the wage;
(A5.4)  W B = l [ ( l  - P)s + Ph W°]
w he re
(A5.5) Z = 1 - P—E _  [ 1 . ( 1 - ^ )* • l/E] > 0
E - 1
Z is increasing in E since
( A5.6)
az
9E
p
(E - i f
—E—in|—E—1( 1 - 
E - 1 'E - 1 "
l/E >0
Thus, more market power, interpreted as a reduction in E (a lower 
product demand elasticity), implies a higher wage for a given 
unionisation level.
The critical level of union density, p + , from which higher 
unionisation implies a wage above the competi t ive level, is 
therefore decreasing in the size of the firm's market power. 
Moreover, as long as p>p  + , the union captures a part of the rent 
created by more market power.
C h a p t e r  6 F u r t h e r  L a b o u r  M a rk e t  App l i ca t ions  of  th 
Social Cus tom  Model.
In this chapte r ,  we consider  two further labour  market 
applications o f  the social custom approach to economic analysis. 
The first is concerned with the debate concerning the credibility 
of the harassment  threat in the insider-outsider literature on 
involuntary unemployment . The second is concerned with the 
analysis of tax evasion and how the social custom model is able to 
offer explanations of observed behaviour which are difficult to 
reconcile with orthodox theory.
6 . 1  On  T h e  C r e d ib i l i t y  o f  H a r a s s m e n t  in the I n s i d e r  
O u ts id e r  M o d e l :  the  I m p a c t  of  Soc ial  C u s t o m s  and  
D i s c r i m i n a t i o n
6 .1 .1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is wel l -known that theories  of long-term involuntary 
unemployment in free-market economies must be able to explain 
the absence of effective underbidding by unemployed workers. 
The various explanations of involuntary unemployment which are 
currently and widely regarded as the most powerful address the 
issue of underbidding directly. Efficiency wage models, for 
example, carry the implication that firms will not wish to recruit 
underbidding workers who, by the very fact of their apparent low
reservation wages, signal their low potential productivity to the 
firm. Hysteresis models based on the depleted human capital or 
scarring effects of long-term unemployment are also consistent 
with firms not being attracted towards the employment  of 
workers who might be prepared to underbid the wages of 
employed workers.  Insider-outsider models are capable  of 
explaining both (a) why firms might not replace incumbent 
workers with underbidding workers and (b) why unemployed 
workers might not underbid even if they would be prepared to 
work at wages less than or equal to the wages received by 
insiders, ceteris paribus. The choice by firms not to recruit 
underbidding outsiders has a number of possible sources. First, 
the replacement of insiders by outsiders can be expensive because 
of hiring, firing and training costs Isee Lindbeck and Snower 
(1984a)]. Second, effort might be inversely related to the labour 
turnover rate, giving the firm an incentive to maintain a stable 
workforce [see Lindbeck and Snower (1984b)]. Third, insiders 
might  withdraw cooperation from new entrants to the firm, 
thereby lowering the potential productivity of workers who would 
be prepared to underbid incumbents' wage levels. Similarly, the 
decision by outsiders not to underbid could follow from the 
threats made by insiders to harass new entrants, thereby raising 
the entrants' disutility of work [see Lindbeck and Snower (1988)].
The above explanat ions of the absence of effective 
underbidding are underpinned by rigorous traditional neoclassical 
micro-foundat ions. A less tradi tional , but equally rigorous.
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explanation was provided by Akerlof (1980) who argued that a 
social code invoking firms and workers to recognise a fair wage' 
cou ld  also gene ra te  invo lun tary  unemployment  without  
underbidding. Akerlof argued that a more sophisticated social 
code would be one by which insiders refused to cooperate in the 
training of new entrants. Clearly, Akerlofs social custom model is 
c losely related to the cooperation-harassment  variant of the 
insider-outsider model developed by Lindbeck and Snower.
In this part of the current chapter we are concerned with 
this relationship between, on the one hand, the particular insider- 
outsider model based on cooperation and harassment strategies 
and, on the other, the social custom model associated with Akerlof 
(1980). Lindbeck and Snower (1986) have argued that the social 
customs, of the sort discussed by Akerlof, do not themselves play 
any intrinsic role in influencing economic behaviour or outcomes: 
they simply reflect the optimising behaviour of individual agents. 
More concretely, the social norms - or mores - which appear to 
induce unemployed workers not to underbid the wages of the 
employed are merely the reflection of the futility of underbidding: 
"Our line of argument suggests that these mores may be traced to 
the entrants'  anticipation of hostile insider reaction and that this 
reaction may follow from optimisation behaviour of insiders." 
ILindbeck and Snower (1986)| .  Social norms are an output of 
rational individual optimisation, they have no impact on economic 
outcomes. Elster (1989) takes issue with this view, arguing that 
the threat of hostile insider reaction is unlikely to be credible
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given that insiders are likely to suffer disutility from hostility: "If 
an outsider is hired, would it then still be in the insider's interest 
to be unfriendly and uncooperative? Since Lindbeck and Snower 
believe that 'harassment activit ies are disagreeable  to the 
harassers '{Lindbeck and Snower (1988)) ,  they ought  also to 
assume that outsiders will recognise this fact and, in consequence 
will not be deterred by fear of harassment." [Elster (1989)]. That 
the threat of harassment is not sufficient to deter underbidding 
leads Elster to conclude that a social norm will be necessary to
sustain the insider-outsider model.
In this chapter we explore this claim. We conclude that some 
social convention is necessary for the validity of the harassment 
argument in the Lindbeck and Snower (1988) one-period insider- 
outsider model. Hence, we are in agreement with both Akerlof 
(1980) and Elster (1989). However, we find the addition of a role 
for a social convention to be otherwise consistent with the insider- 
outsider framework and, in particular, to add further weight to 
the claim that insider-outsider models can provide a rationale for
the presence of trade unions, as well as suggesting an important
role for discrimination.
6 . 1 . 2  The  N o n - C r e d ib i l i t y  of  H a r a s s m e n t
Harassment by insiders increases the entrants'  disutility of
work above that of the incumbent insiders and thereby, ceteris 
paribus, raises the outsiders'  reservation wage above that of the
insiders. This enables the insiders to push their wage above their 
own reservation wage without risking underbidding so long as the 
wage level stays below the outsiders' reservation wage. Of course, 
the wage that insiders can set will also be subject to the firm’s 
absolute profi tabi li ty constraint.  Harassment  affects only the 
disutility of work and hence insiders and outsiders are assumed to 
have equal productivity if we abstract from other features of 
insider-outsider models, such as cooperation, effort and turnover 
costs. In the current paper we are interested in isolating the 
effects of harassment activity and therefore we shall assume that 
all workers are homogeneous with respect to productivity. Figure
6.1.1 represents the simple case in which, in the absence of 
harassment, all workers have a reservation wage of r. If there are 
initially m workers ,  then the firm will wish to expand 
employment  to mi ,  recruiting mi - m  new entrants. If, however, 
insiders can harass new entrants and hence raise the latters’ 
reservation wage to r i ,  without affecting their own disutility of 
work, then the m incumbents will be able to raise their wage to 
without risking underbidding. For simplicity, we assume that 
harassment is a discrete choice.
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Figure  6.1.1. Reservation wages and disutilities of work.
If new entrants are recruited by the firm, then insiders will have 
an incentive to harass: harassment is a dominant strategy for the 
insiders as it is costless. Anticipating this, entrants will not offer to 
work for less than . The threat of harassment is credible. However, 
if we now allow insiders' disutility of work to be affected by their 
harassment activity, then the picture changes.
We now suppose that harassment  activities are indeed 
disagreeable to the harassers. In the event  that harassment still 
takes place, the insiders' disutility of work is higher and hence 
their reservation wage increases to some new level, denoted by r th 
So long as rj1 <r£, there remains some scope for insiders to bargain 
a wage in excess of r, without inducing underbidding. However, 
harassment of entrants by insiders is no longer a credible threat. 
As Fehr (1990) argues, if the insiders'  bluff is called and new 
entrants are employed then, in the absence of  some p re ­
commitment  mechanism, insiders will prefer not to implement
harassment. In terms of the extensive game form representation. 
Figure 6.1.2 represents this argument in the manner of Elster 
(1989) .
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Figure 6.1.2 The credibility problem.
If the firm employs no new entrants, then this is the best possible
outcome for insiders who receive a wage w, as in Figure 6.1.1.
Outsiders  receive their reservation payoff, r. If entrants are
employed at some wage, r, greater than r but which underbids the 
previous wage of the insiders, then we assume that this lowers
the insider's wage to some level w.  If there is no harassment, 
insiders receive w < w: they are worse off than had no new 
entrants been employed. However, they will not have an incentive 
to harass as doing so would lower not only the new entrants' 
utility from work (by some amount a), but also their own payoff 
(by an amount c which represents the insiders'  disutility of 
harassment). Again, we see that the insiders' harassment threat is 
not credible.  Elster (1989) concludes that a social norm is 
necessary  to prevent  underbidding from undermin ing  the
harassment pillar of the insider-outsider model. We turn to the 
role of social norms in this context in Section 6.1.3.
The aspect of the harassment-credibility problem which has 
not been ident if ied before lays in its potential f ree-r ider  
characteristicj . All insiders might agree that a policy of harassing 
new entrants would improve their wage prospects,  but each 
insider is likely to calculate, at least when the workplace is large, 
that his/her own contribution to the collective harassment activity 
is small relative to that individual's private costs of harassment. 
In other words, the benefit of harassment - laying as it does in the 
deterrence of underbidding - is a public good to insiders. When 
the number of incumbents is large, provision of the public good, 
that is participation in the collective action of harassment , 
acquires the characteristics of a multi-person prisoners' dilemma 
[see Olson (1965) and Hardin (1982)]. Each individual has a 
dominatant  strategy of free-riding and therefore the outcome is 
the failure of collective action. No-one will harass, the threat is not 
credible and so underbidding will occur.
Situations in which multi-person collective action fails to 
achieve optimal provision of a public good are wel l-known. 
Schel ling (1978) offers probably the classic treatment.  More 
recently, a number of papers have developed formal models in 
which collective action failures can be overcome by forces of social 
custom and peer pressure. These models are based on the 
dependence of an individual's utility on the behaviour and beliefs
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of other individuals in the relevant population. Akerlof  (1980) 
provides the seminal paper in this area. Booth (1985) develops a 
model showing how the existence of union membership can be 
explained in the social custom framework. Also in this tradition, 
Naylor  (1989)  analyses  strike solidar i ty .  N ay lo r  (1990)  
demonstrates  the relationship between these models  and the 
framework associated with Schell ing (1978).  Addit ional ly ,  
Hollander (1990) develops a social exchange approach to 
voluntary cooperation which is capable of providing an analysis of 
collective action problems broadly in this tradition.
In the current application we construct a social custom 
model which provides an explanation for the credibility of the 
harassment threat in the insider-outsider model. We can imagine 
two ways in either of which a social custom might have a bearing 
on underbidding. First, if agents follow a social code which 
specifies a minimum fair wage, as in Akerlof (1980), underbidding 
might be anathema, even without the harassment threat. Second, 
a social norm amongst insiders invoking workers not to free-ride 
on the harassment activities of their colleagues could generate the 
collective action needed to sustain the credibility of the threat of 
harassment. This is the case we now turn to examine in some
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detail.
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6 . 1 . 3  A Social Cus tom  Solution
We write the utility function of an insider, i, as:
Ui = wj (p) - Li - c(Hi) - ejp(l - Hi),
where ft proportion of insiders who harass
Hi = 1 if individual i harasses 
0  otherwise
WJ the insider's wage, which is assumed 
constant across all insiders and is a 
decreasing function of p
Li = 1 if the insider is employed 
0 otherwise
c = the insider's disutility of harassment
£i the individual's sensitivity to peer 
p r e s s u r e .
We assume that there is social custom invoking workers to 
participate in harassment  activity. Workers who adhere to this 
social custom are rewarded with solidarity-derived utility. We 
shall be concerned only with the case in which all incumbents 
remain in employment, hence we assume Lj = 1. We are able to 
ignore the effect of the individual’s harassment decision on w, 
through p ,  because of  our assumption of a large incumbent 
workforce. If the individual chooses to harass, utility is given by
1 4 1
W j( p)  - 1 - c
Conversely, if the individual does not harass, utility is
NH
wi(|i) - 1 - ejp
The individual will be indifferent between harassment and non­
harassment if
This is represented by the decision schedule in Figure 6.1.3. Also 
in Figure 6.1.3 we represent the distribution of the parameter e. 
We assume that individuals are homogeneous and hence that 
there is a common value for e across the population: ei = e. This 
follows Schelling (1978) and Booth (1985). Consequently, the 
existence of harassment activity depends on the relative strengths 
of e and c. If c is large relative to i ,  then the F = 0 schedule will lay 
further toward the right and will not intersect e = e within the 0 < 
p £ 1 range. In such a case, p = 0 is the only possible outcome. As c 
falls sufficiently (or, alternatively, as e rises) the decision schedule 
intersects the e = e distribution schedule. There are now multiple 
equilibria. We can identify three types of equilibrium when the 
schedules are as depicted in Figure 6.1.3. First, if p = p* then there
F
i.e. c / p
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is a Nash equilibrium. No individual can increase his or her utility 
by changing behaviour. If, however, jj. > jo.* then everyone would
be better off by engaging in harassment and hence p will tend 
towards unity. Conversely, if p < p* then everyone will prefer not 
to harass and hence harassment will atrophy. Consequently, p = p*
is the critical level of harassment activity which insiders must
achieve. But p* is not itself a stable equilibrium: the only stable 
equilibria are at p = 0 and at p = 1. It is clear that the critical level 
of harassment activity, p*, is growing in the insiders' disutility of 
harassment and falling in the insiders' sensitivity to social custom 
or solidarism effects. If e is sufficiently small relative to c then the 
only equilibrium is at p = 0. There are no values of c and e, 
however, which generate p = 1 as a unique equilibrium outcome: p 
= 0 is always a stable equilibrium. For the threat of 100%
harassment to be credible, outsiders must perceive that c and 
are such that p > p*.
F ig u re  6.1.3 A Collective Action Solution.
I 0J
There are various ways in which solidarity amongst insiders 
might  be enhanced,  thereby raising the value of e and, 
consequently, lowering p.*, the critical mass level ot harassment. 
For example, it is common in the literature on insider-outsider 
models to regard insider power as closely related to trade union
power. Indeed, Lindbeck and Snower (1986) argue that the 
insider-outs ider  model can be interpreted as providing a 
microeconomic rationale for the existence of trade unions. Our 
model is consistent with this view. A trade union is one possible
social institution in the workplace which can serve to increase the
solidarism of collect ive action amongst  workers, and in the 
present context,  to sustain the credibility of the harassment  
threat .
A second such social institution [or social convention, 
following Sugden's (1986) more general definition) is the presence 
of discriminatory tastes or beliefs among workers. If workers in 
an establishment belong to one social group and outsiders [are at 
least perceived to belong) to another, then a discr iminatory 
attitude could cement  col lect ive harassment amongst  insiders 
against new entrants. The more overt is discrimination among 
different groups in a society, then the more powerful is the 
harassment  argument  likely to be within the insider-outsider  
framework, especially if the stock of unemployed workers is not
drawn randomly from the different social groups. In this light, 
discrimination can be seen as a device by which insiders increase 
their bargaining power. This means that the social convention of
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discr imination is likely to be more durable than are the 
individuals'  tastes for discrimination, conceptualised by Becker 
(1957), which are utility-lowering to the holders.
6 . 1 . 4  Conc lus ion  a n d  F u r t h e r  R e m a rk s
Insider-outsider models provide an important insight into the 
microeconomic determinants of various key "stylised facts" of the 
macro-market for labour. Within this framework, there are a 
number of complementary explanations of why firms might not 
wish to recruit new entrants who are offering to underbid current 
job  incumbents. Additionally, the harassment hypothesis suggests 
a reason why outsiders might not choose to underbid insiders 
even if the outsiders' reservation wages are below the wages 
received by insiders. At least for the one-period case, however, 
this  explanation is undermined by the credibi li ty  problem 
confronting the threat of harassment. In the current paper we 
have addressed this issue, identifying the public goods nature of 
harassment activity and arguing that the multi-person prisoners' 
dilemma root of the credibility problem can be overcome by the 
presence of a social custom and associated peer pressure effects 
among the population of incumbent workers. The social custom 
approach allows for solidarity-derived utility which effectively 
acts as a private incentive benefit offsetting the private cost of
harassment. So long as participation in harassment exceeds a 
critical threshold, then insiders will harass unanimously. The 
prospects for successful collective action - unanimous harassment 
- are greater (i) the lower is the critical mass required and hence 
the lower is c, the insiders' disutility of harassment, and (ii) the 
greater is i, the incumbents'  sensitivity to solidarity around the 
social convention.  The latter can be enhanced through the 
presence of trade unions or, alternatively, is likely to be a 
characteristic of inter-group discrimination. Hence, the model is 
consis tent  with the idea of the insider-outsider  f ramework 
providing a rationale for unionisation, and also suggests that the 
framework - or at least those models incorporat ing the 
harassment  thesis - is likely to be more powerful  when 
discrimination is a feature of the labour market.
In order to concentrate on the application of the social 
custom model to the issue of the credibility of the harassment 
threat in the insider-outsider model, we have made a number of 
simplifying assumptions. In the further development of this work 
a number of these assumptions should be relaxed. In particular, 
the social custom model should be nested in a more complete 
model of profit maximising behaviour by the firm. Second, we 
have assumed that workers are homogeneous with respect to 
solidarity-derived utility. Therefore the only stable equilibrium 
levels of harassment occur at p = 0 and p = 1. Allowing for worker 
heterogeneity would produce the possibility of an intermediate 
stable equilibrium. The effects of this on outsider behaviour are
potentially interesting but complex. Finally, we have focussed on 
the issue of the threat of harassment . The determinants of 
cooperative activity are likely to be similarly amenable to the sort 
of analysis we have developed in this section of the current 
chap te r .
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6 . 2  Confo rmi ty  and Conscience in the Context  of Tax 
E v a s i o n
6 . 2 . 1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are a large number of economic contexts in which the 
act ions of individual  economic agents  are l ikely to be 
interdependent, either through the strategic nature of the agents' 
behaviour or through preference interdependency. In the context 
of tax evasion,  Cowell (1990) has shown that the empirical 
evidence suggests the importance o f  taking into account  the 
influence on taxpayers’ behaviour of, inter al ia , morality and the 
attitudes and actions of community, which we interpret as a form 
of preference interdependency.  In part icular,  Cowell  cites 
evidence from Baldry (1986, 1987) that some individuals choose 
not to evade, 'apparently on moral grounds, '  and from Schwartz 
and Orleans (1967) indicating that, 'Social devices that appeal to 
conscience and civic responsibility may be more effective than 
legal sanct ions.’ In the current context  we argue that our 
understanding of  the impact of morality and conformity on tax 
evasion can be enhanced by the application to this problem of the 
social custom model developed by Akerlof (1980) and applied to 
the problem of  the provision of public goods by Naylor (1989). 
Our approach is closely related to the model developed by Cowell 
(1990) and is supportive of his conclusions. In particular, we find 
the prevalence of both "epidemics" of  evasion and "clumping"
behaviour in equilibrium. The major differences lie in our explicit 
t reatment  of heterogenei ty of  the relevant  populat ion with 
respect to the individuals' sensitivities to the actions and beliefs of 
others and  in our explicit  dist inct ion between morality and 
conformity effects.
The plan of this part of the chapter is as follows. In section
6.2.2 we examine the impact of conformity on tax evasion and 
analyse the comparative static properties of model. In section
6.2.3 we extend the model to allow for heterogeneity with respect 
to sensitivity to a social custom and consider how this affects the 
properties of the model. In section 6.2.4 we offer some concluding 
r em arks .
6 . 2 . 2  Tax  Evas ion  a n d  C onfo rm i ty
Cowell  (1990) describes the individual’s decision about tax 
evasion as a two stage process in which the person first decides 
whether or  not to evade and, secondly, decides how much tax to 
evade, conditional on the first stage decision. This paper addresses 
the first stage in such a process.
We characterise the individual by the utility function:
(6.1) U = U(y, t, p. f, S, c)
where y represents gross income
t represents the amount of tax to be paid
f represents the fine for evasion
p represents the probability of detection
s represents the utility derived from
conforming with the group of tax-payers
c represents the utility derived from
adhering to the social custom invoking
individuals to act honestly.
We follow Akerlofs definition of a social custom as, "an act whose 
utility to the agent performing it in some way depends on the 
beliefs or actions of other members of the community." We specify
(6.1) more precisely as, without loss of generality, the additively 
separable utility function:
(6.2) U = y - t(l-Q) - pfQ - RQ - cQ
w h e r e  s =  i 1 if the individual evades paying tax 
(.0 otherwise
Hence, if the individual decides to evade paying tax, t. she has 
utility given by gross income, y, minus the expected value, pf, of 
the fine, f, minus the foregone utilities associated with adhering to 
the social custom and with conforming with other tax-payers. We 
now specify the conformity-der ived utility to depend (i)
7 It can be shown that the results of the model are not changed qualitatively 
we allow for symmetric conformity effects within the group of non-payers.
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positively on the proportion, p, of the population paying the tax, 
and (ii) on the individual ' s sensitivity, e, to the pressure to 
conform. Thus,
(6.3) S = ep.
Hence, (6.2) becomes:
(6.4)  U = y - t(l-Q) - pfQ - epQ - cQ
Accordingly, if an individual evades the tax (Q=l) ,  the utility, UE, 
of doing so is given by:
(6.5)  U E = y - pf - ep - c
Whilst the utility, UNE, associated with honest payment (Q=0) is:
(6.6) UNE = y - t
We assume that the individual will evade the tax if UE > UNE. 
Hence, the individual evades if:
(6.7)  t > pf + ep + c
i.e. if, ceteris paribus, t is sufficiently small, or if:
( 6 . 8 ) E <  ( t  - p f  - C ) / p
i.e. if, ceteris paribus , e is sufficiently small.
In Figure 6.2.1 we graph the schedule e = (t -pf - c)/p. We 
call this the evasion-schedule. To the right of this schedule we 
have that e > (t -pf - c)/|i, and hence for these parameter values 
individuals will not evade. Conversely, to the left of the evasion- 
schedule e < (t -pf - c)/p, and hence individuals will evade.
£
Figure 6.2.1 The Decision Schedule
The distribution of e is assumed to be uniform with a lower 
bound of e l and an uper bound of e H It can be shown that the 
results are not sensitive to this assumption. Any non-convex 
distribution of e will possess qualitatively similar properties. In 
Figure 6.2.2 we bring together the evasion and distribution 
schedules .
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Suppose the proportion of the population paying the tax is 
initially at the level p i ,  in Figure 6.2.2. Then these will be the 
individuals with the greatest sensitivity to the conformity derived 
utility. Hence, from the distribution schedule in Figure 6.2.2 we 
can identify the pi payers as those individuals for whom ei < el ^ 
eH. All of these individuals have e > e, the degree of sensitivity 
associated with indifference between payment and evasion:  
defined as the value of e which satisfies equation (6.1) - the 
evasion schedule in Figure 6.2.2 - for p = P i • Therefore, p i 
generates sufficient conformity derived utility to be at least self- 
sustaining. Additionally, however, there will be individuals among 
the 1-pi non-payers who will be induced to pay by the pi  level of 
payment conformity. Thus, 1-pi is not an equilibrium degree of 
tax evasion. The proportion of the population paying tax will grow 
from a level such as p i .  Indeed, we can see from Figure 6.2.2 that 
wherever the distribution schedule lies to the right of the evasion
schedule there will be this tendency for the proportion paying tax 
to increase. Conversely, wherever the distribution schedule lies to 
the left of the evasion schedule there will be a tendency for the 
proportion evading tax to fall.
In this way it emerges that there are three equilibria in the 
case depicted in Figure 6.2.2. These equilibria are at p*, pcri, and 
at p=0. p cr|t has the properties of a critical mass level of payment: 
it is, for example, an unstable equilibrium. If the proportion of the 
population paying tax is less than this level, p Crii- then there will 
be insufficient  payers to generate the necessary conformity-  
derived utility to sustain payment. In this circumstance p will 
tend to atroph to zero. There is an "epidemic" of non-payment. 
As a corollary of this, p=0 is a locally stable equilibrium. If, on the 
other hand, the proportion of the population paying tax exceeds 
pcri, then p will tend to increase to p*. There will be a payment 
epidemic. Similarly, p will fall to p* from above. Thus, p* is locally 
stable. Hence, in the case depicted in Figure 6.2.2 we are likely to 
observe the clumping behaviour described by Cowell (1990) at 
either p=0 or at p*. Notice that p* <1.
Of course. Figure 6.2.2 represents just one possible outcome. 
There are two other possible cases. These are both variants of  the 
case shown above. First, suppose that the evasion schedule lay 
further to the left such that the two schedules intersected only 
once - at p crit- Then the properties of this case would be the same 
as above except that the non-zero stable equilibrium would be at
|i = l,  involving no tax evasion. Second, if the evasion schedule lay 
everywhere to the right of the distribution schedule then the only 
equilibrium would be the p = 0  stable case, implying total tax 
evasion. We are now in a position to examine the properties of the 
model .
( i )  Property 1 - a  c h a n g e  in  c.
Assume initially that the outcome is at p = p* in Figure 6.2.2. 
An increase in c, the disutility of breaking the social custom, will 
shift the evasion schedule to the left. This will cause p* to rise, 
possibly until there is 100% payment, and will lower the critical 
mass required to induce payment.
( i i ) Property 2 - a c h a n g e  in  p ,  f .
An increase in the expected cost of evasion, that is in either 
p or f, will have the same effect as an increase in c. p* rises and 
M-crit falls.
( i i i )  Property 3 - a  c h a n g e  in  t.
An increase in t will cause the evasion schedule to shift to
the right causing a fall in p* and a rise in p cru.
( i v )  Property 4 - a n  a s y m m e t r y .
From an initial outcome such as p* ,  in Figure 6.2.2, a 
parameter  change which causes the evasion schedule to lie 
everywhere to the right of the distribution schedule (such as an 
increase in t) will induce a fall in the proportion paying tax to p = 
0. Should there then be a return to the previous parameter values 
(e.g. a restoration of the previous tax rate) then p* is again a 
potential stable equilibrium outcome. However,  it is n o t  the 
n e c e s s a r y  outcome, as p = 0 is itself a stable equilibrium. Thus, 
we have the possibility that two otherwise identical situations (in 
time or place) might exhibit very different behaviour with respect 
to tax evasion,  because of the multiple  equi libr ia  which 
characterise the possible outcomes. An implication is that taxing 
authorities must pay attention to the problems associated with 
inducing an epidemic of non-payment from an initial clumping 
such as p*. It may be much more difficult to induce the reverse 
epidemic. The difficulty is likely to depend upon the level of p Crii- 
the critical mass.
( v ) Property 5 - c h a n g e s  in  e .
An increase in the sensitivity of individuals to conformtiy- 
derived utility is represented by a r ightward shift in the 
distribution schedule. This will raise the stable non-zero level of p 
and lower the critical mass level. A mean-preserving reduction in 
the variance of e is represented by a clock-wise rotation of the 
dis t r ibut ion schedule . In the limit, when individuals  are 
homogeneous with respect to e, clumping occurs at p = l and p=0.
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6 . 2 . 3  Tax Evasion and Morality
In the previous Section we considered how sensitivity of the 
population with respect to the degree of conformity to tax-paying 
creates interdependencies and therefore, inter alia, clumping and 
ep idemic  behaviour .  We assumed that  individuals  were
homogeneous with respect to c, the disutility of transgressing the 
social custom invoking individuals to honest behaviour. In this
Section we allow for heterogeneity with respect to c. Initially, we 
assume that the population can be divided into those who believe 
in the social custom, and therefore experience disutility c of 
breaking the custom, and those who are non-believers and who 
therefore experience no such disutility.
Under these assumptions, the utility function becomes:
(6.9)  U = y - t(l-Q) - pfQ - epQ - cQb
where parameters are as before and b=l for believers and b=0 for
non-believers. Hence, we now have two evasion schedules: one for
believers and the other for non-believers. For a believer, i. we 
have that the individual will evade tax if:
(6 . 10) Ei < (t - pf - C)/H
For a non-believer, j, we have that the individual will evade tax if:
(6.11) ej < (t - pf)/p.
These two evasion schedules are depicted in Figure 6.2.3.
Figure 3. Tax Evasion Equilibria
From Figure 6.2.3 we see that the model has changed in an 
important respect.  It is still the case that p =0 is a stable 
equilibrium and that there is a critical mass, p Crii. level ot p.  
However, in place of single-point equilibria at p* and p Crit. we now 
have ranges of  locally stable equilibria. Thus, we have a richer set 
of multiple equilibria. Otherwise the properties of the model are 
unaffected by the introduction of the dist inction between 
believers and non-believers.
At this point, however, we should introduce the new 
condition for equilibrium required in the extended model. In 
equilibrium we should now require that the proportion of the 
population obeying the social custom, i.e. the value of p 
representing the proportion of  the population paying the tax, 
should be equal to the proportion of the population believing in 
the social custom, i.e. the proportion of the population, say t, for 
whom b=l .  We follow Akerlofs (1980) definition of a long-run 
equilibrium, adopting his assumption that if t is greater (less) than 
p then t  will fall (rise). This assumption can be justified on 
cognitive dissonance arguments. To show the implications of this 
assumption, we generalise our previous interpretation of equation 
(6.9) by allowing b to be a continuous rather than a discrete 
paramete r .  We now think of the populat ion as being 
heterogeneous both with respect to e and with respect to b. We 
assume the joint distribution of e and b to be described by a 
convex set. From equation (6.9), we have that the individual will 
be indifferent about evading tax if:
(6 .12)  b = (t - pf - ep)/c
We depict equation (6.12) in Figure 6.2.4 along with the convex 
set, represented by the circle, defining the joint distribution of b 
and e .
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Figure 4. Joint distribution of b and e.
From Figure 6.2.4 it is clear that as p increases the schedule 
representing equation (6.12) shifts downwards and hence that the 
first derivative of t with respect to p is first increasing and then 
decreasing. Hence, we can show the x(p)  schedule as in Figure
6.2.5.
Figure 5. Long-run equilibria
From Figure 6.2.5 we can see that when the proportion 
paying tax is greater than p, the proportion of the population
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believing in the social custom, t, exceeds that proportion, p, paying 
the tax and hence i will fall. We can apply the same logic to the 
process occurring from an intial point to the left of p. The 
conclusion is that p is a stable equilibrium outcome. In other 
words, extending the model to allow explicitly for both social 
cus tom and conformity effects  preserves  the resul t  that 
"clumping" will occur in equilibrium. The level of tax evasion at 
which this clumping occurs will depend, as we have seen before, 
on the parameters of the evasion and distribution schedules.
6 . 2 . 4  Concluding  Remarks.
We have considered the roles for both conformity and social 
custom effects in determining the degree of tax evasion within a 
populat ion.  The populat ion has been taken to refer to the 
reference group relevant to the individual’s decision regarding tax 
evasion. A society is likely to be made up of various such 
reference groups. Each group is likely to be characterised by 
different values of the paramaters  influencing tax evasion. 
Therefore, we should expect to find the different groups or sub­
populations experiencing clumping behaviour at different levels of 
p, implying differential rates of tax evasion across the groups. 
Within the society's population as a whole, then, the pattern of 
rates of tax evasion will depend upon both the behaviour of each 
group and the proport ion of each group within the whole
populat ion.  This  a s su m e s  that  the sub-popula t ions  are 
independent. Any interactions between these groups will raise 
further issues which go beyond the scope of this paper, but which 
suggest a potentially fruitful agenda for further research.
Our starting point  was the observation that empirical 
evidence on tax evasion has suggested an important role for 
conformity and morality considerations. We have attempted to 
model these inf luences within the social custom approach 
developed originally by Akerlof (1980). Our results support the 
arguments made by Cowell (1990) who finds that "clumping" 
behaviour and "epidemics" of evasion are likely to characterise tax 
evasion behaviour. In particular,  we have shown that the 
influence of conformity generates a critical mass level of evasion 
which, if exceeded leads towards mass evasion. The stability of 
this non-payment equilibrium must inform the policies designed 
by tax authorities, given the asymmetry or ratchet effect we 
described in Property 4 in Section 6.2.3. So long as the level of 
evasion is less than the critical mass, there is a stable equilibrium 
level of tax evasion: which can be non-zero. The population, then, 
clumps either at zero payment or at the stable equilibrium with 
some proportion paying and the rest evading tax. When we allow 
for morality effects, we find that if the joint distribution of the 
two parameters indicating sensitivity to conformity and morality 
effects is convex, then there is just  one stable equilibrium 
solution. There is not a critical mass under these circumstances, 
but there is clumping: with g paying the tax, and 1-g evading tax.
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Chapter 7 C o n c l u s i o n s
In recent years there has been a growing literature on the role of
social customs in the labour market. A central theme of this
literature is that a rational economic agent does not inhabit a 
social vacuum and hence that individual behaviour is influenced, 
to some extent,  by the actions of others. Nonetheless,  the 
dominant  mode of economic analysis largely neglects such
considerations. Economists frequently dismiss the relevance for 
economic analysis of social norms with the retort that these are in 
the domain of enquiry for other social science disciplines. It is, 
they argue, for sociologists and social psychologists  to be 
concerned with the derivation of individuals'  preferences. The 
economists can then take these as given and consider what 
economic outcomes will follow from them. If, however, individual 
preferences are constantly changing in response to the economic 
environment  which they themselves largely shape, then the 
assumption of exogenei ty is invalid. Similarly, if individual 
preferences are not independent, then economists have to revise 
their thinking.
The starting point of this thesis has been the observation 
that, in important economic contexts, individuals’ actions appear 
to be influenced by the actions and beliefs of others. It could be 
argued that there is no need to model this interaction between 
individuals'  beliefs and actions, and therefore no need to refine
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the orthodox economic approach, were it the case that this 
approach provided a satisfactory framework in such interactive 
contexts. However, this argument cannot be maintained: not even 
by the traditional "as if" defence of methodological positivism. 
This is because the predictions of the orthodox model do not sit 
comfortably with actual outcomes. For example, as Olson (1965) 
has argued, economic logic militates against successful collective 
action in large numbers contexts. Yet it is apparent that this logic 
does not describe real behaviour in the many situations where the 
free-riding option is spurned. Albeit to a differing degree - and 
one which varies over time and across individuals and societies - 
individuals vote, pay taxes, take their litter home, give blood, 
donate to chari ties,  pay extra for environmental ly-fr iendly 
products and join in demonstrations. The issue at the centre of  
this thesis revolves around the question of how, if at all, we can 
reconcile this behaviour  with the assumptions of economic 
rat ional ity .
There have been many attempts to refine the definition of  
economic rationality in such a way as to be able to explain how 
the problem of the Prisoners' dilemma is overcome. In this thesis, 
however, we have focussed on a social custom approach which has 
its origins in the work of Akerlof (1980) and which has been 
developed in various contexts by a growing variety of researchers. 
We have vlaimed that in this way we have been able to explain 
various otherwise puzzling features of  economic behaviour in a 
variety of contexts.
In Chapter 3 we provided a formal derivation of the social 
custom model in the general context of explaining the logic of 
collective action. We demonstrated the close relationship between 
our model and the work of Schelling on the micro-motives of 
macro-behaviour and considered applications of the model to the 
issues of  explaining trade union membership density and strike- 
solidarity levels. The original feature of our work was the 
relaxation of the assumption that all individuals are identical. The 
assumption of heterogeneity enabled us to explain important 
'stylised facts' of behaviour in these contexts. In particular, we 
were able to make sense of the micro-econometric evidence that 
workplace rather than personal character is t ics  are important  
determinants  of an individual worker 's trade union status. We 
also suggested that our approach was consistent  with survey 
evidence on individuals'  reasons for union membership.  Most 
important we were able to provide an explanation for the 
observed intermediate density levels in union open shops.
In Chapters 4 and 5 our concern was to integrate the social 
custom model  developed in Chapter  3 into more orthodox 
economic models in order to demonstrate the relevance of the 
social custom approach for mainstream analysis. In Chapter 4 we 
combined the social custom model of  trade union density with the 
more mainstream microeconomic theory of the trade union. We 
argued that this is an important step to take as the predominant 
approach has been to assume that wage bargaining takes place
between a firm and a trade union which has closed shop powers. 
Instead, open shop arrangements characterise the majority of 
bargaining cases and therefore motivate an analysis of the causes 
and consequences of intermediate union representation within the 
establishment. A second novel feature which Chapter 4 shared 
with the subsequent chapter was the treatment of union density 
in the disagreement payoff to the firm when bargaining takes 
place. Our argument has been that where we are dealing with the 
open shop union it is not generally valid to assume that wages are 
set by a monopoly union. Instead we have preferred the more 
general right-to-manage model in which we have specified a role 
for union density (endogenously determined) to affect the union's 
relative bargaining power.
In Chapter 5 we pursued the themes developed in Chapter 
4, but adopted the assumption of a role for management  
opposit ion to trade union organisation in the determination of 
union density and therefore of relative bargaining power. In both 
these chapters we developed the comparative static properties of 
the model, identifying the ways in which they differ from more 
conventional  analyses.
In Chapter  6 we considered two further labour market 
applications of the general approach with which we are concerned. 
The first was to the issue of the credibility of the threat of 
harassment  in the insider-outsider approach which explains the 
decision by outsiders not to underbid as resulting from threats
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made by insiders to harass new entrants, thereby raising the 
entrants'  disutility of work. The second application was to the 
question of tax evasion. In this context, Cowell (1990) has shown 
that empirical evidence suggests the importance of  taking into 
account the influence on taxpayers'  behaviour of, inter a lia , 
morality and the att itudes and actions of community.  In 
particular, Cowell cites evidence from Baldry (1986. 1987) that 
some individuals choose not to evade, apparently on moral 
grounds,' and from Schwartz and Orleans (1967) indicating that, 
'Social devices that appeal to conscience and civic responsibility 
may be more effective than legal sanctions.' In the current context 
we argued that our understanding of the impact of morality and 
conformity on tax evasion can be enhanced by the application to 
this problem of the social custom model.
In the approach we have been developing throughout this 
thesis, we have taken the existence of the social norm as given, 
just as utility arguments are taken as given in the standard 
neoclassical analysis. Just as it is not regarded as incumbent upon 
standard analysis to offer an explanation for the origins or nature 
of utility arguments, so we could evade awkward questions about 
the origins of social norms and customs. We prefer not to, 
however. In Chapters 1 and 2 we offer comments and thoughts on 
the origin of the sorts of social customs with which we have been 
dealing. Our essential argument  has rested on a distinction 
between, on the one hand, social conventions and. on the other, 
social norms or customs. We have argued that the latter are likely
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to develop out of  the former as a consequence of social 
conventions acquir ing a moral status commanding appropriate 
arational psychological behaviour. Where the social conventions 
might themselves be explicabe in terms of traditional economic 
theory (as  Sugden has demonstrated ve ry  elegant ly)  the 
development of social customs transcends excplanation by narrow 
economic rationality.
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